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NO. 6253 
In the Supreme Court, State of Utah 
JoHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT TAY-
LOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquida-
tion of the Bank of Heber City, 
Plaintiffs and ResponJent.s., 
vs. 
]. HARoLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD, 
His Wife, J. RuLON MoRGAN, ]. RuLON 
MoRGAN, as the SurviVing Partner of the 
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partner-
ship, ELIZABETH j. BAIRD, BANK OF 
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State 
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah, 
and SPENCER ·C. TAYLOR, as Examiner 
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and 
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F. 
SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SM-ITH, 
His Wife, and J. HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
j. R'uLoN MoRGAN, 
Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 
Cross .. Defend ants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
1266 Civil 
1410 Civil 
Appeal From Fourth District, Wasatch County. 
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge. 
CHENEY, jENSEN, ·MARR & WILKINS, GEORGE B. STANLEY, 
PAUL B. CANNON AND DELBERT M. DRAPER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Res~ndents. 
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In the Supreme Court, State of Utah 
jOHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT T AY-
LOR, as Examiner in Charge of ~the Liquida-
tion of the Bank of Heber City, 
Plaintiffs and Responden,ls, 
vs. 
]. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD, 
His Wife, ]. RuLON MoRGAN, ]. RuLON 
MoRGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the 
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-·Partner-
ship, ELIZABETH ]. BAIRD, BANK OF 
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State 
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah, 
and SPENCER 'C. TAYLOR, as Examiner 
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and 
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F. 
SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SMITH, 
His Wife, and J. HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
]. RuLoN MoRGAN, 
Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
RuLON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of .the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 
Cross-Defendants. 
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1266 Civil 
1410 Civil 
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As ·stated by Appellants the case 1before the Court 
involved two actions, ,one numbered 1266 Civil and the 
other 1410 Civil, whi,ch were consolidated for tvial. The 
Court made one set of Findings of F·act a·nd ·Conclusions 
of Law, and one De.cree. 
We will first take up the argument of Appellants in 
case No. 1410 wherein A. C. Moulton and E. D-ewey ~foul­
ton are plaintiffs. The Appellants have set forth their 
statement of the issues in that ease commencing at page 
3 of their brief. Before taking up each issue, we \vill 
1nake a further statement of the facts and the parties 
involved. 
A. ·C. 1\foulton and E. Dewey Moult•on held tvvo 
pron1is-sory note~s signed ·by Josie Baird Giles and J. 
Harold ·Giles, each dated January 1, 1931, upon which 
judgment was recovered ·on O:ctober 1, 1934 in the total 
sum of ·$4;974.67, together with $370.00 attorney's fees 
and $14.20 costs of C'ourt, which judgment bore interest 
at the rate of 81o per annum. There was no issue as to 
the validity of this judgment. The action on the promis-
s·ory notes \Vas ca.se N~o. 1261 ~Civil and the file in that 
case is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The $15,000.00 promissory 
jnote executed by Vern or Baird and given to Josie Baird 
~Giles wais attached by the \Sheriff in case No. 12161 Civil 
on July 7, 1934, and the promis-sory note taken int,o the 
possessi~on of the .Sheriff. Execution was issued on De-
cember 19, 1934. Notice of sale wa.s posted and a eopy 
was mailed to Morgan & Mor·gan on January 25, 1935 
(Tr. 23, 3'5, 39, · Ab. 118, 120). The promissory note 
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" ... a.s sold :by the Sheriff and purchased by A. C. Moulton 
and E. De,vey Moulton J a.nuary 29, 193-5. The m:o:rtgage 
follo\vs the note as an incident thereto. Smith v. J arrnarn, 
61 Utah 125, 211 Pac. 962. The records show that a pur-
ported release of the 1nortgage .securing said promissory 
note dated January 26, 19~5, 'vas rHcorded January 28, 
1935 at nine ·o-'clock A. M., this release being by William 
H. Baird, Attorney in Fact for Josie Baird Giles. A 
ne\\~ mortgage dated J a·nuary 26, 19'35 'vas executed by 
\Tern or E. Baird and recorded January 29, 193:5, for 
$5,000.00 in favor of A. B. Morgan and J. Rulon Morgan, 
co-partners, doing business under the firm name and 
style of Jinrgan & Morgan. A warranty deed from 
Vernor E. Baird to Elizabeth J. Baird dated January 
28, 19a5 \vas recorded on the morning of January 29, 19'35 
at 9 :05 A. M. The Power of Attorney from J·osie Baird 
Giles to William H. Baird was not re-corded until J anu-
ary 30, 1935. The Notice of Sale stated the sale "\\rould 
be held January 28, 19135 at ten :o'clock A. M. The sale 
was po-stponed to January 29, 19'35 at 9:30 A. M., at 
which time the sale was held. The appellants dispute 
that the sale \Vas p·ostponed on the 28th or that it was 
held on the morning of J a:nuary 29th. The Trial Court 
so found, ho-wever, and further found that this postpone-
ment \Ya.s at the request of J. Rulon Morgan, one of the 
attorneys for J os,ie Baird Giles. All of the above-men-
tioned d:ocun1ents vvhich \Yere recorded on January 28, 
29 and 30 \Yere acknovvledged before J. Rulon Morgan 
as Notary Public and recorded at the request of J. Rulon 
Morgan or Morgan & M·organ. For the recording· infor-
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rnation see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 which is the ahstrac.t of 
title on the property involved. 
The following relationship exists he tween certain of 
the parties: James R. Baird and Elizabeth J. Baird were 
husband and wife, Jan1es R. Baird having died sometime 
prior to 1'9126. V ern·or E. Baird and Josie Baird Giles, 
who is named a.s Josie Baird Giles (Smith in the Com-
plaint, were children o.f Ja-mes R. Bai:t;"d and Elizabeth 
J. Baird. William H. Baird was another son. J. Harold 
Giles married Josie Baird Giles in 19'24 and 'Ya'S divorced 
from her by Interlocut~ory Decree dated July 16, 1934. 
(:See the file in ·Case .No. 1256 C:ivil which was introdueed 
as an exhibit in the case). Ray F. Smith married J.o-sie 
Baird Giles subsequent to her divorce, the date of the 
marriage not iheing in evidence. Such n1arriage would 
necessarily have been subsH>quent to J a.nuary 16, 19·3·5, 
the date when the· divorce frnm J. Harold Gile's becan1e 
' :final. Arthur Duke and Eulean Duke were the occupants 
of the ranch at the time of the trial. :Eljzaheth J. Baird, 
the mother ·of Josie Baird Giles S1nith and Vernor E. 
Baird, died February 5, 1938 and J. Rulon Morgan is 
the executor of her estate (Amendment to Complaint, 
Afb. 38). J. R.ulon Morgan is also nan1ed as a defend-
ant as a surviving partner of the firm of l\l,organ & 
Morgan, attorneys. The $15,000.00 promissory note at-
tached and sold by the l\{oultons -vva·s .given in October, 
192.9 to Josie Baird Giles by Vern or E. Bair.d, as the 
purchase price for a ran,ch S'old to Vern or by Josie. There 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
is no issue in this ·case a.s to execution and delivery of 
this promi·ssory note. It is admitted by the pleadings. 
It is also admitted tha.t Vernor E. Baird paid $10.00 on 
this note (Tr. 68, A·b. 12·6) and that he gave an additional 
check as a payment thereon, which was returned for in-
sufficient funds (Tr. 54, Ab. 123). It is undisputed that 
Vernor Baird to.ok tpossession of the ranch in 19129 (Tr. 
271, Ab. 170). Joe Walker ran the farm for Vernor and 
remained there through the season of 1934 ('Tr. 36.5, Ab. 
200). 
One of the issues raised in this case is as to whetheT 
or not the mortgage securing said promissory n.oite was 
released so as to defeat the rights of the Plaintiffs. It 
is ~laimed in the pleadings of the Defendants and Ap-
pellants that there was an agreement to release this 
m~ortgage prior to the date of the a.ttachm.ent of sa.id \Ilote 
or the levy ·of execution thereoTI. We do not admit the 
materiality of any agreement to release the mortgage as 
admittedly the release wa.s not given until after the note 
was in the hands of the Sheriff un;der both the Writ of 
Attac:hment and Writ of Exeeution. A substantial por-
tion of the testimony ·at the trial deals, however, with 
the question of whether or not there was a p·rior a.gree-
ment to release the mortgage and to convey the p·roperty 
by Vern or E. Bair·d to ElizaJbeth J. Baird. The Court 
found there "\vas no such agreement (Finding No. 14, 
.A!b. 88). :Of .course if there was no ·such agreement the 
matter is disposed of. We hel~eve that without question 
the ·Trial Court was correct in. its finding. Assuming, 
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however, that there was such an agreement Respondents 
take the position that if any such agreement was made 
it wa.s ·without consideration and therefore in fraud of 
ereditor·s; that any such agreement is immaterial as 
it was never carried out or executed prior to the attach-
rnent or pri,o:r to the execution levied o:n the note; that 
such agreement being oral was void as against the at-
taching creditor and subsequent purchaser because it 
was in violation of the Statute of Frauds. 
Appellants attempt to make a point of the fa·et that 
when the $15,000.00 promissory note was purchased by 
the Moultons the bid was only $100.00. The questioTI 
of the $100.00 bid is fully dis,cussed hereafter. However, 
we wish to po[nt out that at the opening of the case 
counsel for Plaintiffs stated that no deficiency judgment 
would be taken against Vernor BHird, that the judgment 
taken would he only for the amount of the judgment by 
the Moultons against Josie Baird Giles and her husband, 
J. Harold Giles, and that upon the payment of such 
amount the judgment against the Defendants would be 
released. Of course, the fa-ct that only $100.00 was bid 
for this note is no legal reason why it should not be en-
forced. However, since the Appellants have rarised the 
question we point out fhat the Plaintiffs in case No. 1410 
Civil are asking nothing except that which is owing to 
them. The proceedings are only an attempt to enforce 
an honest obligation. The Appellants on the other hand 
have done everything po~ssible to prevent the payment 
of an hone-st oibligation. 
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ARGUMENT REGARDING AGREEMENT TO RELEASE MORTGAGE, 
THE CONSIDERATION FOR SU·CH RELEASE AND CON-
VEYAN·CE BY VERNOR E. BAIRD TO ELIZABETH J. BAIRD. 
(See pages 27 to 39 of Appellants' Brief) . 
.... \ppellants elaim that son1etime in the year 1933 
an agreement 'Yas made between Josie Bnird Giles, 
Vernor E. Baird and :E;Jlizabeth J. Baird, their Mother, 
that Josie would release the mortgage, that Vernor would 
conYey the property to Eliza beth .free and clear of all 
eneumbranees and that Elizabeth vvould release Josie of 
a·n indebtedness ovYing· from Josie to Elizabeth. This 
is in fact 'Yhat 'Yas atten1pted by the conveyances record-
ed on Jan nary 28, 29 and 30, 1935, except that Vern or E. 
Baird g-ave a mortg-age of $5,000.00 to the firm of Morgan 
& Morgan. The .consideration claimed by Josie was that 
she, Josie, owed Elizabeth approximately $6,000.00 ('Tr. 
76, 77, Ah. 128). The entire evidence of any such agree-
ment between Elizabeth, J o.sie and Vernor was oral. 
There vvas not the slightest evidence in 'vri ting or in the 
acts of the parties shoV\ring that sueh an agreement was-
made excepting the instruments subsequently recorded. 
It is admitted by J. Rulon Morgan that he received n·otice 
of sheriff's sale, mailed by the .sheriff on January 2-5, 
1935 from Heber City (Tr. 39, 336, Ab. 120, 191). That 
he prepared the documents at or subsequent to that time, 
ex~cepting· the Power of Attnrney, which he claims was 
executed December 1'2, 1934, but which document was not 
recorded until January 30, 1935, sub-sequent to the date 
of re·cording of all other docume·nts. Josie Baird Giles 
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who is supposed to have signed the POiwer of Attorney 
in Decem·ber 19'34 was in California in January 19a5. 
It is claimed she exe·cuted the Power of Attorney just 
pr.ior to leavci.ng .for California. As to the $6,000.00 con-
sideration, Josie Baird Giles co.nte'nded that she owed 
her Mother a promissory note o.f $3,500.00, which was 
executed at the time of the ·closing of the James R. Baird 
e.sta.te in 1·92'6. That the balance of the $6,000.00 or $6, 
500.00 which she owed was on aecount of money given 
her by :her Mother (Tr. 76, 77, Ab. 128). The promissory 
note was never produced. !She testified that she had an 
account book of monies advanced by her Mother (Tr. 96, 
Ab. 133). Such aecount bo~ok was never produced a.t 
the trial. 
In ·considering the evid·ence of this indebtedness we 
call attention to a. statement by this Court in the case of 
Paxton v·. Paxtoni, 80 Utah 540 at 5\53, 15 P. (2d) 1051, 
wherein the following statement i'S made: 
"It is quite generally :held that a transfer or 
mortgage of property between nea.r relatives 
which is calculated to~ prevent a creditor from 
realizing on his ~claim against one of such relatives 
is subject to rigid ·scrutiny. 27 ·C. J. 495, a~nd cases 
there cited. Under the rule, a transfer or mort-
gage of property made to a near relative in con-
sideration of past-due indebtedness will be sus-
tained if attacked in a ·creditor's suit when, and 
only whe·n, it is shown the debt is genuine, that 
the purpnse of the ·grantee or mortgagee is honest, 
and that he acted in good faith in obtaining his 
title or lien. The burden, in such case, is east 
upon the grantee or 1nortgagee to show the good 
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faith of the ti·n.nsaet.ion bv ·C1ea.r and satisfa:ctorv 
eYidence. Elliott & Co. v. "Johnson, 85 W.Va. 706, 
10~ S. E. GS1: \V" oody Y. Tucker, Willingham & 
Co., 215 ~~tla. 278, 110 So. ±65; Flint v. Chaloupka, 
78 Keb. 594, 111 N. \V. 465, 13 L. R. A. (N. IS.) 
309, 126 Am. St. Rep. 639; Jones v. Beers, 118 
Ore. 31 I, 2±6 P. '711." 
The C'ourt refused to sustain the mo~rtga.ge in that 
ease when there \Yas no other erviden·ce, except the state-
ments of the partie·s to the transaction. 
We agree 'vith Appellants that a trl:le picture of the 
evidence can be secured ·only by reading the transcript. · 
''T e """ill, however, point out pertinent portions o.f the 
testimony material to our argument. 
(a) WAS THERE ANY AGREEMENT TO RELEASE THE MORT-
GAGE AND CONVEY THE FARM? 
The testimony of the Bairds was that in 19·33 an 
oral agreen1ent vYas made to rele·ase the $15,000.00 note 
in ~consideration of a. conveyance by Vernor to his Moth-
er, Elizabeth, and a release hy Elizabeth of the indebted-
ness supposedly owing from Josie to her Mother. Written 
evidence and acts of the parties ·subsequent to 1933 show 
clearly that they all considered that Vernor was still the 
owner of the ranch. We call attention to the answer of 
Josie Baird Giles in ease No. 1266 ·Civil, filed by the B·ank 
Commissioner on August 14, 1934 against J. Harold 
Giles and Josie Baird Giles for the foreclosure on the 
water stock. Josie verified her anS"W·er on October 11, 
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1'934 and stated 1n paragraph 7 with regard to such 
stock: 
'''She sold said c.ertificates of \Vater stock and 
the water represented thereby to Vernor E. Baird 
and ever since said time said Vern or E·. Baird 
has been Rnd no·\v is the legal owner o.f the same. 
" 
When this discrepancy \vas pointed out at the trial 
Josie ''s counsel inserted the amendme·nt \vhich now ap-
pears in. the Ans\ver and which adds that since 1933 Eliza-
beth J. Baird has been the equitable owner of said certi-
ficates. The an1endment was not made until after the 
trial had opened (Tr. 246, Ah. 1·64-). At the time the 
origi'llal ansvver \Vas made Morgan & Morgan \Vere ad-
vising l~er and the ans,ver \Vas prepared and s'\vorn to 
subsequent to the time when Mo-rgan & Morg·an sup-
posedly had been asked to prepare deeds foT transfer 
of the real estate and water stock to Elizabeth. See 
testin1ony of J. Rulon Morgan (Tr. 343, 344, Ah. 19~3, 
194). If an agreen1ent had been made in 1933 to trans-
fer the property to Elizabeth, and if the firm of Morgan 
& Morgan had been told to n1ake out the papers con-
sumating this transfer, such a situation- ''ras certainly 
not reflected by the vei'ified ans\ver of Josie in the aetion 
filed by the Bank of Heber City. The an1ended cross-
complaint of J. Rulon Morgan as exe-cutor of the Estate 
of Eliza·beth J. Baird, deceased, alleges that Vernor E. 
Baird began to use the water in 1929 and 
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"·continued to use such "·ater for irrigation pur-
poses until the irrigation season of 1935 ". (A b. 
56, para. 6). 
The eYidence shows that there 'vas no transfer of 
the possession of the farm in 1933 and tha.t Joe \IV alker, 
who was running the farm for Vernor, continued in pos-
session through the year 19134. ('Testimony of Josie Biaird 
Giles ·Smith, Tr. 81, .A.b. 129). In 1935 th·e property was 
leased to Josie's then husband, Ray S!mith. This, of 
course, ,,-as after the actual transfer of title from Vernor 
to Elizabeth and t"~o years after the sup;posed agreement 
to convey to the ~!other. Ray Smith could not have 
leaHed the property as Josie's husband prior to 1935 as 
the Decree of Divorce from Harold did not become final 
until January of that year. Josie testified that the agree-
ment with her Mother 'va.s that the property should be 
conveyed to her free and clear of indebtedness (Tr. 93, 
.Alb. 13'2). When conveyed, instead of being free and clear 
of encumbrances it wa.s subject tn a. mortgage for $5,-
000.00 to the firm of Morgan & Morgan. When asked 
about this mortgage Josie first stated that she instructed 
Wd.lliam to giYe that mortgage, though she later changed 
this testimony and said she didn't know 'vhy it vvas 
given ('Tr. 114, 115, Ab. 13.S). Josie claims to have made 
the agreement with Verno-r and her Mother in 1933 and 
not to have been able to ·close the transaction, making it 
necessary to leave a Power of Attorney with William 
dated December 12, 1934. Her testimony is that she lived 
\vith Vernor fro1n October 1933 until the last of Decem-
ber 1934 (tTr. 129, 130, _._\.b. 141). It seems that Josie 
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was afraid to app-roach Vern or on the closing o.f this 
deal though she t~stified that. sh·e was keeping house for 
him for $10.00 a month, out of which she had to run the 
house ('Tr. 136, 137, A~b. 142). Surely Vernor under 
such circumstances and while J-osie was living in the 
same .house, could have been approached upon the matter 
of executing a deed to Elizabeth if the parties had al-
ready agreed upon giving such a deed. Josie testified 
that she was waiting to get the $15,000.00 note. The 
transfer was made quickly enough without the $15,000.00 
\ 
note after the notice of sale was received hy the firm of 
Morgan & Morg·an. Morgan & Morgan even saw fit to 
take a $5,000.00 mortgage to themselves "vithout the sur-
render of the $15,000.00 note to Josie. Vernor signed 
this oblig~ation though he ow·ed Morgan & Morgan 
nothing. ('Tr. 371, Ab. 201). 
Eliza1beth Baird died i'TI February of 1938 and Rulon 
Morgan was appointed her executor, yet his account as 
exeeutor shows no collection of rent from the tenant on 
the ranch (Tr. 230, Ab. 160). Mr. Duke, who had been 
on the ranch since the de1ath of Eliza:beth Baird had paid 
considerable rent after Flebruary 1938 (Tr. 23'2 & 2'33, 
Ab. 1-60, 161). Vernor continued the listing of the ranch 
as his property and the $15,000.00 note as a liability in 
the years 19-33, 19·34 and 193.5 (See Exhibits 14 and 15). 
AppelLants make the following statement regarding these 
exhihi ts at page 31 of their Brief: 
'' N:either of these exhihits were filled out 
when signed and J. Clyde Mitchell, a. witness, 
·called by the Moultons testified that the Wasatch 
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Livestock Loan Company knew that Vernor -¢lid . 
not claim title to the farm at the time the appliea-
tion wa.s made.'' 
The testimony, we believe, does not support the 
statement that Mr. Mitchell kne\V tha.t V·ernor did not 
claim title to the farm. It shows that Vernor while he 
may have signe·d the applications in blank directed what 
should go on the statements and the sta.tem·ents were 
filled out accordingly. His testimony is as follows, ('Tr. 
380}: 
"Q. Well you made· a statement In 1935 didn''t 
you Mr. B1aird ~? 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. And you made that up from your 19'34 state-
ment didn't you~ · 
''A. Well I would say part -of it was. 
"Q. Part of it was taken from the old statement 
and part was new material? Is th-at right~ 
''A. That is wha.t I would say. YeB. 
''Q. And you told Mr. Mit·chell what to· put In 
that was new did you not? 
"A. Yes sir." 
The penciled notations on Exhilbits 14 and 15 which 
are the financial staten1ents, were made by the Wasatch 
Livestock Loan to show what was to go in the new state-
ments which were signed in bla:nk (Testimony of Mr. 
Mitchell, Tr. 383, A b. 204). Vern or B-aird continued to 
instruct the L~ivestock Loan to put the farm !()fi the state-
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ment until October 26, 19316, when it was taken off (Testi-
mony of Mr. Mitchell, Tr. 388, Ah. 205). 
) 
Mr. Mitchell stated tha:t, (Tr. 388): 
''For s-ome time- we had known for some 
tilne -vve weren't going to have the farm." 
Mr. Mitchell did not say that Vernor did not claim title 
to the £arm. Of course, if it was m-ortgaged for $15,000.-
00 whi·c.h he was not able to pay it could easily be sup-
pnsed that he would not have the farm very long. I~t was 
brought out that t.he budget allowed by the Wasateh Live-
stock L,oan did not provide ·a;nything for the running of 
the farm. This was natural sinee the W asa,t~ch Livestock 
Loan was not taking a:ny of the money from the farm 
which could be used £or running it or applied on the pay-
ment of the mortgage if \!Jernor so desired (Tr. 389-390, 
Ab. 204, 205). Vernor was very free at first to deny that 
he had given any sta.teme-nts listing this nanch as an 
asset CTr. 867, kb. 200). 
T;he statement in the aJbstract of record of Mr. Mit-
chell's testimony t.ha t, (A h. 205) : 
''W·e kne~w that he did not c1aim title to the 
farm prior to the time the notation was made, be-
cause we made no provision for any payment on 
the farm. . '' · 
-is not borne out by the testimony. There was no reas-on 
given as to why no provision was made for p1ayment on 
the farm exeept that they were not ta~king the proceeds 
from the farm ('Tr. 389, 390). 
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At p.ag·e 31 of Appellants' B·rief it is .stated that 
Elizabeth paid the :assessment levied upon water s·took 
in 1933. The matter of the payment by Elizabeth to the 
Lake Cre·ek Irrigation Comp·any will be taken up more 
thoroughly hereafter. She did not, however, make· any 
paymenl in 1933. Admittedly the records of the Lake 
Creek Irrig·a tion Company show that .in 19~34 the Clom-
pany '\Yas given credit on its note to Elizabeth J. Baird 
for $132.20, which wa.s the entire balance due on her note. 
The total amount required to be p1aid was $157.20. The 
difference ·of ·$2·5.00 ,,~as paid by Vernor Baird. ~The rec-
ords .of th·e Company as read by Judge Hansen at the 
trial definitely show this. His statement is as follows, 
( Tr. 307, A b. 180, 181) : 
''Paid March 13, 19134, amount of check turned 
~back to Company to apply on assessment owed by 
Josie Baird Giles and V ern·or Baird a's shown 
albove. Vernor paid $25. Total $157.20. '' 
If Vern or ·had no interest in the pr.operty why· W3Js he 
paying ~$25.00 in 1'9•34 and why was the assessment owed 
by J o.sie Baird ·Giles aind Vern or Baird~ 
There was another assessment paid hy Elizabeth in 
1~37 (Tr. 308, .L~b. 181). This is immateriJal a.s it was 
after the 193:5 sale of the ·note and deed to the property. 
·Certainly it cannot be claime·d that the partial payment 
by Elizabeth in 1934 s'hows ·an equitable transfer of 
the property from Vernor to Elizabeth when Vernor was 
required to pay $2·5.00 ·of the ass.essment. N·o doubt he 
was hard up and that was all he could pay. The Comp1any 
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o:wed Eliz.a.beth money and it is certainly within the realm 
of possi!bility that Elizabeth w·ould give Vernor a tem. 
porary lift. 
The follo~wing question and answer were given on 
dirHct examination. of Vern or as to the pos'Session of the 
ran·ch after the supposed deal in 1933, (Tr. 36-2) : 
''Q. Now what was done with respect to the orwn ... 
ership and operation of the ranch from that 
time on1 
''A. Well want on about the same as it had been.'' 
This statement is ·omitt·ed from the a.bstvact. 
On pages 28 .and 32. of App·ellants' Brief there seems 
to he .some contention made that Josie had no right to 
sue Vern or on· the promiss·ory note for some other rea-
son than the claimed agreement of 19~33~ The r·eas·on for 
this, is set forth on P1age 37 of A ppella.nts' Brief where 
they state: 
'''Moreover, if the ·Trial ·C,o~urt's ·finding with re-
spect to the lien of the Heber City Bank is to be 
sustained, Vern or. had a right to rescind the con-
tract of pur·ch.a.se and repudiate the note as to 
Jo·sie, and likHwi'se as to the Moultons, who in 
any event acquired no greater right than Josie 
ha~d at the time of the levy.'' 
We do· not see upon what theory this -contention is made 
unless it is that there was s-ome kind of anticipatory 
breach of the duty .of Josie to deliver the stock upon pay-
ment ·of the mortgage to her. At no tim·e did the claim 
of the Bank exceed the a.mount due on the note from 
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Vernor to Josie. Had he paid his note the lien on the 
st.ork could ha"\""e been readily discharg-ed. If there is 
any merit to Appellants' contention, then every contract 
of purchase where the Yendor maintains a mortgage on 
the property being purchased "rould be subj·ec.t to can-
cellation at .once by the buyer. Furthermore Vernor made 
no objection to the pledge of the stock to the Bank and 
never pretended to refuse payment on that acc:ount. R. 
S. U. '33, 104-37-27 is cited by Appellants (Page 29). This 
section of the statute deals "~ith sheriff's s~ale. So long 
as the mortgage had not been released ·bef.ore the attach-
ment or execution on the note, it has no application. 
At pa.ge 33 of their .hrief Appellants mention the fact 
that Josie Baird Giles obtained her divorce from J. Har-
old Giles upon the groood of failure and refusal of the 
Defendant to p·rovide Plaintiff with the common neces-
sities of life. The file in that ·case was introduced over 
Respondents' objecti~n apparently to show that Josie 
was with.out funds. Surely Respondents are not bound 
by the findings of the Oo~urt in a case to whrich they were 
not a party and whic.h wa;s never ·contested. Her testi-
mony was that he would have paid her if he had had the 
money (Tr. 27 5, .A!b. 171). 
·Rulon Morgan was ·called as a witness to explain the 
reason for taking the $5,000.00 mortgage to Morgan & 
Morgan, which mio:rtgage was prior in time to the con-
veyance to. Elizabeth J. Baird. Rulon Morgan claims 
that one of the reasons f.or talcing the mortgage was to 
assist Elizabeth J. Baird in the procuring of funds to 
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pay off the bank in ease No. 12·66 Civil in case she lost 
the suit. It is not only unusual for attorneys to be so 
'S•O'licitous of .clients' financial arrange-ments, prior to the 
time when the neeessity for financial assistance is nec-
essary, but it also shows .an extreme lack of confidence 
in the merits of the defense. It also appears tha:t Vernor 
Baird, the signer of the $5,000.00 promissory note, was 
in no 'vay obligated to the firm .of Morgan & Morgan 
('Tr. 371, A b. 201). 
('b) WAS THERE A $6,000.00 OBLIGATION OWING BY JOSIE 
BAIRD GIL:IDS TO ELIZABETH J. BAIRD? 
The contention of Appellants is that Josie owed her 
Mother approximately $6,000.00. That a portion of this 
wa.s a $3,500.00 note given ''when t'he estate was settled" 
('Tr. 7~6, 77, Ab. 128). Josie test~fied that she gave this 
note because she took s.ome of the most expensive ground 
('Tr. 77, A:b. 128) .' William B:aird testified fhat at the 
time his Father's E·state was being settled his Mother, 
Elizabeth, advanced $3,000.00 ·Or more to the Estate 
(Tr. 13S, ~b. 142). He testified that it was necessary to 
have the $3,000.00 "to make the division" (Tr. 160, 
omi~tted from Afbstr:act). Each of the children were re-
quired to ·give a note to .s-ettle this with their Mofher ('Tr. 
161, A b. 146). See also the t.estim.ony o.f Vern or Baird 
('Tr. 36·6, Ab. 200). Vernor was very definite that he gave 
his M~other only one note. William and Vernor were 
teS<tifying with regard to the very money advanced by 
Elizabeth 'by reason of vvhich Josie w:as supposed to have 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
g1ven Elizabeth a $3,500.00 promiss.ory note. We sub-
mit that from the testin1ony the advance and the notes 
given ,,~ere necessarily prior to distribution of the estate. 
"\Ye no'v eall attention to the Final Aceount, Report -and 
Petition for Distribution in the matter of the Father's 
Estate (See 'Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8). On page 6 of the Final 
Account it a.ppears that the estate received $3,16·5.00 on 
).I arch 4, 1926 fron1 Eliza beth J. Baird. \Villi am Baird 
'vas asked as to \Yhether or not ''this \Yas the amount ad-
Yaneed to fhe estate". He said, (Tr. 1·63, 164, Ah. 146) : 
''I imagine it is. It is three thousand o-r m.ore. 
I don't know just exactly.'' 
It is therefore esta.blish.ed by Appellants.' own witnesses 
that the adYance made by Elizah~th was prior to the 
division of the property and tha.t the $3,16·5.00 entered 
in the account "Tas the money referred to. The account 
show·s that this money was paid in full by .cash and the 
giving of promissory notes,----the note of Josie heing for 
only $153.32, not $3,500.00 (see p:a ge 23 of Exhibit 8). 
On that page of the account it appears that Elizabeth 
rec.eived $500.00 in cash and promisso-ry notes, which in-
cluded the note of Vern or E. Baird of $19121.32, of Wil-
liam H. Baird of $153.32 and of Josie. B:aird of $153.32. 
William testified that his note -vvas for one hundred and 
some dollars ('Tr. 161, 164, A h. 146). Vernor testified 
that he gave only one note and it was for $900.00 ('Tr. 
365, 366, .A!b. 200). It the ref ore appears that there was 
an advance of money by Elizabeth but the sett·lement was 
made in full without any note by Josie except the one 
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for $i.53.32. Josie did pay her note .of $15·3.32 (see the 
nota.tions on the back of Paintiffs' Exhibit 10 and testi-
mony of Josie, Tr. 291, 2.9·2, Ab. 175). 
If Josie received more than her share in real estate 
why didn't she give her Mother part of the sheep dis-
tributed to her~· She re.eeived 1915 head of ewes and 3 
hucks. (See . the Decree o.f Distribution at page 25 of 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). The she.ep were sold for $4,000.00 
(Tr. 130, Ab. 141). Elizabeth herself received 585 ewe 
shee-p and 9 bucks (page 23 of Exhiibit 2.). Certainly any 
discrepancy in values could have- been adjusted by change 
in the distribution of sheep without giving additional 
promissory notes. AH of the heirs signed the P·etition 
for sp.ecific distrilbution of the property of the estate, 
in which the following statement is made, (pages 29 and 
33 of Exhibit 8): 
''We, the undersigned, \vido-vv and children 
of James R. Baird, deceased, together with L·. C. 
Montgomery, the :Guardian ad-liten1 of Evelyn 
Baird a. minor child, respectfully represent as fol-
lows, to wit :-
1. That we have met together, partitioned the 
property of said estate as nearly as can be done 
by us and to our s:atisfaet~ion, one-third to the 
-vvidow and one-ninth to each of six children hav-
ing an interest in the said estate, the seventh 
child, John M. Baird "Tith his ''rife A'liee I. Baird 
having assiigned all the right, title, interest, claim 
~and demand of the said J·ohn M. Baird of, in and 
to the property of said estate to the petitioners 
herein, to be distributed to them the same as 
though the said John J\1. Baird had no interest. 
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The prop~rty partitioned to each of the under-
signed by the a~ction of all and suhj ec.t to the· .ap-
proval of th[s court to be distributed to them as 
all of the remaining' prop.erty of the ~said estate 
after paying costs and expenses o.f administration 
not already paid and of closing the estate and is 
as follows, to wit:-" 
How could there, after such careful division of the prop ... 
erty, be any necessity for further adjustment 1 
At page 34 of Appellants' Brief reference is made 
to a sale by Mrs. Ba1ird to Josie of a. part of the prop·erty 
to which Mrs. B·aird was entitled. We submit there is 
no testimony in the record that Mrs.. Ba.ird sold any prop-
erty to Josie. 
We now consider the question of claimed advances 
made hy Elizabeth a.fter the closing of the estate. On 
cross-e:x;amina tion -of Josie, she was continually asked 
for a definite itemization of this. supposed $3,000.00 in-
debtedness. The only items that could be given by her 
were a $100.00 dentist bill, hospital and doctor bill of 
$250.00, $25.00 for an apartment and $75.00 in 19132 when 
she moved. IShe was asked, ('Tr. 99, Ah. 134) :· 
"Is that all you can tell us about this $3,000.-
00 as to when you received it1" 
to which she replied: 
"iWell, yes, it is right at the present.'' 
She said that she had an account of the indebtedness to 
her Mother (Tr. 94, 95, Ab. 133). Nothing further was 
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ever said at the trial a:bout this account. Surely if any 
had existed counsel would not have overlooked it. That 
there was no definite obligation by Josie to pay her 
Mother whatever monies were advanced was shown by 
the following question and answer (Tr. 101, 102, omitted 
from A·bstra:ct). 
"Q. Isn't it a. fact that that was just an allow-
ance, Mrs. Smith, she gave you beca~se she 
had money~ 
'·'~A. Well I don't kno-w." 
We submit that the testimony with regard to the sup-
posed $3,000.00 indebtedness iby Jo-sie to her Mother on 
account of advances is not such as would permit .a. find-
ing of consideratiion for the transfer as requir·ed within 
the case of P:amton v. Paxton, a'bove cited. 
DID ELIZABETH J. BAIRD PURCHA1SE THE· STOCK CERTIFI-
CATES FROM THE LAKE OREgK IRRIGATION COMPANY? 
(See Appellants' Brief, pages 2:5 to 27 and 54). 
The evidence does not show that Lake Creek Irriga-
tion Company ever acquired title to the stock. The stock 
in question has at all times stood in the name of Josie 
Ba~rd Giles (Tr. 315-16, Ab. 184). No notiee of the 
assessment or sale wa.s ever given to Josie Baird Giles 
('Tr. 303, 304, 317, A b. 178, 184). This was the only sale 
ever held by the Company (Tr. 817, Ab. 184). Assum-
ing, however, that the c~ompany had title to the stock, 
there .is no recor-d that the ·01ompa.ny ever sold the stock 
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to Elizabeth J. Baird. On the contrary the reeords show 
that it 'Yas redeen1ed by \,.. ernor. The follo,ving is taken 
from· the minutes of the Company as read in evidence by 
Judge Hansen (Tr. 307, Ab. 180): 
" 'Resolved that the stock s~old for assess-
Inent and bought in by the Lake Creek Irrigation 
Company at their meeting of April 1, 1933 has 
been redeemed by the following stockholders by 
paying all o blig·a tions on the stock. 
" 'Therefore, Be It Res·olved that the old 
certificates be surrendered and the President and 
Seeretary of the Company be authorized to issue 
new certificates to release the stnck from the 
·Treasury of the Company. T.he following shares 
were ihought in by the Company April 8, 1933.' 
''There are ten ·names written on -the page and 
oppos~ite the names are figures under the word 
' shares'. Among those names is Vern or Baird 
without the number of shares and a mere ditto 
mark, then it continues : 
'' 'The Secretary was authorized to p.ay the 
amount due Mrs. Baird as soon as the mo·ney is 
collected fron1 the delinquent assessments.' '' 
Since the stock \Yas redeemed by ''the following stock-
holders", Vernor Baird was the one who redeemed this 
stock. 
No minutes appear anywhere in the records show-
ing a sale to Elizabeth B-aird. Mr. Crook, Preside-nt of 
the Company, testified that the water stock was never 
sold to her ('Tr. 214). 
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we particularly request the c·ourt to refer to the 
Transcript, and not to the abstra.ct, for this testimony, 
be·eause the a.bstract report (pages 156-7) is at variance 
with the Transcript on this point. We submit that the 
testimony as given fails to show a sale of water stock to 
Elizabeth Baird at any time. 
1ng: 
1ng: 
At page 213 of the Transcript appears the follow-
'~ Q. And as these assessments fell due from time 
to time you merely took the assessments out 
of the money that the -corporation was owing 
Mrs. Baird, isn't that it~ 
'·'·A. No, sir; not always. 
'·',Q. Well, I understand but most of the time~ 
"A N . 
. o, s1r. 
,., Q. Do you know what part of this time as shown 
by these hooks~ 
''A. I kno·w of one instance, yes, sir. 
'·' Q. Is that all~ 
' 'A. That is all. ; ' 
·At page 214 of the Transcript appears the follow-
'·' Q. Do you recall at a time when the company 
agreed to s-ell it to Mrs. Elizabeth J. Baird' 
''A. Not to Mrs. Elizabeth J. Baird, no sir.'' 
E.xcept for the $13~2;20 a.pplied in 19134 on a portion of 
the cost of redemption by Vern or Baird the money owing 
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to Elizabeth by the Lake Creek Irrigation c·ompany was 
paid from monies c-ollected on asse-ssments and applied 
on her nrote in favor of Hylton (Tr. 302-307, Ab. 177-181). 
Appellants state at page :2·6 of their Brief that: 
• •·The -only reason a new certificate vvas not 
issued to Elizabeth J. Baird was because the old 
certificates 'Yere not surrendered to the C'Omp-
any." 
'': e submit that the testin1ony has nothing to do with 
a transfer to Elizabeth. Her na.me is not me·ntioned in 
connection "-ith this testimony ('Tr. 31'2, Ab. 18Q). It is 
much more likely that Mr. Crook had in mind a. transfer 
of the stock to \Tern or rather than a transfer of the stnck 
to Eliza·beth. If the stock had been sold to Elizabeth on 
the title of the ComJ>any secured by assessment, it would 
not have been necessary to secure the sto-ck certificates 
as they would have been cancelled through failure to pay 
the assessments. However, for a transfer to Vern or 
from Josie the surrender of the certificates would have 
been necessary. We submit therefore that Mr. Crook, 
the Preside·nt of the Company, could only have been 
thinking of a transfer from Josie to Vern or when he said 
that the transfer had not been made because ''they 
couldn't give us the old certificates''. In any event the 
name of Elizabeth J. Baird is not mentioned in ·connec-
tion with this statement. It appears to have been com-
mon knowledge tha.t Vernor vvas using the 'vater and he 
\\·as treated in many respects as the o\vner on the books 
of the Company. 
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DO THE CIRCU·MSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE NOTE WAS 
LEVIED ON PRECLUDE THE MOULTON'S FROM CLAIMING 
TITLE TO THE NOTE? 
(See pages 3.9 to 44 of Appellants' Brief). 
We claim five distinct reasons, each of them ade-
quate in itself, why Geo-rge B. Stanley's possession of 
the note in no way pre-clude.s the Moultons from suit 
thereon or claiming title thereto: 
1. ·The relationship of attorney and client has 
never existed between Georg-e B .. Stanley and Josie Baird 
Giles. 
2. Josie was told ihy ~1:r. Stanley to come and get 
the promissory note. 
3. Josie was told long prior to the attachment that 
if the Moulton notes were not paid the $15,000.00 note 
would he attached. 
4. N eit:her Josie nor anyone on her behalf ever 
demanded the note until after it '\Ya.s in the hands of the 
Sheriff. 
5. Josie has waived any objection to the circuin-
stances of the attachment by failing to raise the ohjee-
tion in the action wherein the no;te was atta.ched and sold 
on execution. 
The following fac:ts 'vere ·testified to at the trial, 
there being no- dispute as to the major portion of such 
testimony. The note and mortgage were prepared in 
19:29 by George B. Stanley at the request of Vernor 
Baird ('Tr. 397, 410 and 411, Ab. 208, 211). Josie did not 
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request the "\Vork done or pay for the same. She did not 
testify that she ever had any other conversation "\vith 
Stanley except that she demanded the note, she says, in 
1933. Mr. Stanley says not until after it wa.s in the hands 
of the sheriff (Tr. 398, Ab. 208). The relation of attor-
ney and client therefore did not exist. George ·Stanley 
\vas not admitted to practice law until a year and a. half 
after the preparation of the note and mortgage (Tr. 410, 
Ab. 211). The deed and mortgage \Yere delivered to 
·v· ernor Baird (Tr. 410-411, Ab. 211). Vernor Baird 
recorded both of these docun1ents (see Plain tiffs' Ex-
hi bit 2). Mr. Stanley testified that he wrote letters to 
Josie asking her to come and get the note ('Tr. 398, Ab. 
208). Josie \Yas very certain that she re-ceived no letters 
at all from Mr. Stanley a.t any time {Tr. 107, Ah. 135, 
136) though she had corresponded with Mr. Stanley on 
the subject as shown by· her letter (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6) 
which when shown to her, she admi~tte·d (Tr. 119, Alb. 
138). Mr .. Stanley called on Josie and her hus'hand 
Harold in Heber City to get a. settlement on the Moulton 
notes (Tr. 399, .LL\_b. 208). He told her on at least three 
different occasions that if she didn't pay the Moulton 
notes he \Yould attach the $15,000.00 promissory note 
('Tr. 400, 412, A b. 208, 211). Mr. Stanley testified that 
neither Josie nor anyone else ever demanded the note 
until after it had been taken by the Sheriff (Tr. 400, 401, 
412, 415, A b. 208, 209, 211, 212). Josie could have had 
the note at any time if s'he had asked for it (Tr. 413, Ab. 
211). Appellants argue that under the circumstances it 
would have been unnatural for Josie not to ha.ve demand-
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ed her 'note. If J·osie eX~p·ected 'to ·pay h·er n.otes to the 
Moultons, she would not necessarily have been concerned 
about her $15,000.00 note remaining with George 'Stan-
ley. w.e may assume that her intentions were honest 
a.t the time. 
It must not be forgotten that there is no question 
in this case as to the delivery of the Vernor B,aird n·ote 
to J'osie for the purpose of closing the transaction 
wher·ein she sold the· farm and took a purchase money 
note and m'ortga.ge. The plaintiffs and defendants both 
so allege in their ple1adings. Throughout the trial it was 
admitted that Vernor went into possession of the prop-
erty and made· .a payment thereon. That the transaction 
was. -closed so far as Josie was concerned was beyond 
question. In the preparration of the note and mortgage 
Mr. Stanley received no information whi·ch was not 
clearly dis-closed by the public records in the C'ounty 
Recorder's Office. The mortgage was recorded N·ovem-
ber 12, 19129 (see Plain tiffs' Exhilbi t 2). If J·osie can 
avoid p·a.ying what is admittedly an honest debt to the 
Moultons 'by leaving the note wit:h Mr. Stanley that is 
indeed a. new way to avoid e.reditors. Surely the law 
should favor the payment of obligations rather tha.n 
avoidance of them. 
After George S!tanley had inform·ed Josie that he 
would attach the Vernor Baird note ·he filed suit on July 
7, 1934 and Summons wa.s served on the Defendants on 
that da.y. A Demurrer wa's filed on behalf of J·osie Baird 
Giles on July 2:8, 1934 and another Demurrer was filed 
nn behalf of J. Harold Giles on August 8, 1g.34. Prior 
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to the filing of the Demurrers a default had been entered 
'Which "~as set aside on motion of the attorney for the 
plaintiff. On the ~Oth day of August the Demurrers 
'"'ere oYerruled and notiee thereof given to Morgan and 
~forgan. Default "~a~ ag·ain entered on O,ctober 1, 1934. 
Notice by the Sheriff that the promissory no·te which had 
been leYied upon "Tas admittedly mailed and re-ceived by 
Morgan and Morgan on January 25, 19315 (see E·xhlbit 
12). In all of these proceedings the defendants though 
represented by attorneys never raised the question of the 
legality of the attachment and levy. We believe that 
Josie still thought she would pay her honest obligations. 
If she had any objection to the attachment and levy it 
should ha.ve been raised in those proceedings and she is 
now precluded from any sueh objeetion. See authorities 
citea in the next subdivision of this brief. We further 
call attention of the Court to the fact that Vernor Baird 
in 1938 went to George Stanley for further advice (Tr. 
403, Alb. 209). At least that was the contention and cer-
tain evidence was excluded on that ground. If Q-eorge 
B. Stanley was guilty of failure to deliver the note upon 
demand, is it likely that Vernor \vould have further con-
sulted him a.s an attorney at law~ To e-nforce the promis-
sory note will aid the enforcement of an llonest dbliga-
tion .such as was intended by the parties. If it is denied, 
the payment of a just obligation may be avoided. The 
C'ourt knows of its own knowledge that the town of Heber 
City is a small country town. There are only two or 
three lawyers practicing there. Business transactions 
are prett)'T well known to everyone. GHnrge Stanley knew 
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no more 'vith regard to this transaction by reason of his 
having prepared the instruments than he would have 
otherwise known. As an abstracter the whole matter 
necessarily ~came to his attention from the public records. 
The Trial Court found that the relationship of attorney 
and client never existed between Mr. •S!tanley and Josie. 
We do not see how any other finding could he made when 
there is no testimony that J·nsie ever went to Mr. 8tan-
ley's office except for the purpose of signing a deed. 
We call attention again to the fact that she never testi-
fied to any c-onversation ever had with Mr. Stanley re-
garding the making of these papers. She never employed 
him or paid him any money. If the ·CJontention of the 
appellants is correct that the knowledge acquired by Mr. 
Stanley in the preparation of this 11 ote eould not be used, 
then the levy vvould have been just as invalid if the note 
had been in the possession of Josie herself o~r any other 
party, since it -could still be contended that Mr. Stanley 
first learned of the note by reason of his having pre-
pared it. The atta:ck upon the atta:cbnient in these pro-
ceedings is collateral. Unless the attachment is void, 
the matter may not be raised here. See autho-rities cited 
in the next subdivision of this hrief. 
IS PLAINTIFF'S TITLID TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE AFFECTED 
BY THE CLAIMED DEFECTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT FOR WRIT 
OF ATTA!GHMENT? 
(See pages 44 to 48 of Appellants' Brief). 
The evidence shows t'ha t the writ of a ttachn1ent 
was issued July 7, 1'934 (plaintiffs' exhibit 1) and that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
the sheriff took the note into his possession on that date 
(Tr. 8, Ab. 114). ·The \Yrit of attachment was served 
on the defendants on July 7, 1934. Default wa.s there-
after entered and \Yas set aside on motion of plaintiffs' 
attorney. Demurrers were filed by the defendants which 
were overrued. Judgment was subsequently taken. The 
writ ·of execution was issued D·ec. 19, 19,34 while the 
sheriff still had possession of the note. There is no 
question in this cas·e as to intervening rights between the 
date of the attachment and the date of writ of execution. 
The transfers appearing in the a;bstract were not dated 
until Jan. 26, 1935, and thereafter. The most that can 
be elaimed for a. defective attachment is that the date of 
priority changes to Dec. 19, 19i34 instead of July 7, 1934, 
which in no way affects the rights of the parties. How-
ever, we believe that under the ple·adings there is no 
question before the C'ourt as to the validity of the writ 
of attachment. The plaintiffs allege in their complaint, 
paragraph 7, (Ab. 31): 
"that .on said 7th day ·of July, 1934, :said note and 
mortgage were attached by the sheriff of Wasatch 
County under and by virtue of a writ of attach-
n1en t issued in said action.'' 
The answer of Vern or E. Baird and Mary A. Baird, 
which v1as adopted by the other defendants, recites in 
paragraph 2 (Ab. 40): 
''these answering defendants admit that the 
sheriff of Wasatch County attached the note and 
mortgage mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint in 
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the manner and under the circumstanees herein-
after all·eged and not otherwise. ' ' 
The circumstances thereafter alleged are the circum-
stances as to the. poss·ession of the note by George B. 
·Stanley. It appears, therefore, that the attachment is 
admitted by the pleadings, except so far a.s it is affe-cted 
by the possession of Mr. Stanley. The defendants hav-
ing admitted the attachm·ent c.annot he heard to.complain 
of any irregularity. The defendants further waived any 
such irregularity by their appearance in the suit. The 
following :statement is made 1n 4 Am. Jur., pa:ge 932, 
Sec. 617: 
'·'It is generally held that if a defendant in 
an attachment proceeding wishes to take advan-
tage of any defect or irregularity in the proceed-
ing, he must do so by motion or plea before an-
swering to th·e merits, and that if he makes a 
gener,al appearance or answers to the merits he-
fore sudh motion or plea, the defect or irregularity 
will he waived. '' 
S·ee also S'Bc. 616 on the sa1ne page, and Sec. 649 at page 
940; 6 C. ,I. 433, S~c. ;1004;' 6 C. J. 441 as to attack ·Oin. 
atta-ehm·ent af·ter judgment. 
The question of the r·egula:ri ty of the attachment 
cannot 'be raised in a collateral proeeeding but must he 
by direct attack. The following is a sta·tem~ent to that 
effect in 5 Am. Jur. p1age 174, Sec. 957: 
''The record and judgment in the main actio·n 
1n an attachm·ent or garnishment proceeding is 
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and judgment8 are conclusive. Suc.b a judgment 
is not open t.o collateral attack unless it is vnid 
for lark of jurisdiction in the court rendering it, 
or 'Yas fraudulently secured. D·ef€1c.ts and ir-
regularities in the attachment suit are not opeU1 
to inquiry in a collateral suit unless they were of 
such character as to Yoid the attachment or 
garnisihment and deprive the c.ourt of jurisdiction 
in the proceedings. '' 
T.ha.t the defect in the affidavit does not make the 
attaehment void see A-n'tfl.otation in 72 A. L. R. 120 at page 
122. The same is true of a defective bond. See the same 
Annotation, pag-e 1'25. 
IS THE EXECUTION FATALLY DEFECTIVE? 
(See Appellants' Brief, page 48). 
Appellants complain of the fact that the writ of 
execution did not require the Sheriff to satisfy. th:e 
judgment out of the property attached as required by 
Section 104-37-2, Subdivision {3), !f,. S. U. 1933. The 
Sheriff had possession of the prtomissory note at the 
time the execution was issued. The defendants had been 
~served with ·summons, had appeared in th·e action, and 
judgment had been rendered against them. The attach-
ment proceedings were not necessary to give the C'ourt 
jurisdiction, as the Court had -personal jurisdiction of 
the Defendants. The failure of the writ of execution to 
re·quire the officer to sa ti,sfy the same out of the a ttaehed 
property could do no more than give a date of priority 
as of the ·date of the writ of execution, which was 
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December 19th instead ~of July 7th. No party has been 
prejudieed by the failure of the writ to include the 
recital. The property attached was in fact retained in 
the possession of the Sheriff and sold on execution. 
Everything was done exactly as it would have be·en done 
had the writ of execution complied with subdivision (3) 
of Sec. 104-37-2, R. S. U. 1933. The defect, under the 
circumstance.s, is at most an irregularity which may 
not be attac~ed .collaterally and has been waived by 
failure to raise the question in the prior case. See 23 
·C. J. 693, Section 691 and authorities cited in portion 
of this Brief on the attachment question. 
Appellants cite the New York eases of Gilman v. 
Tucker, .59 N. Y. !Super., 570, 13 N. Y. 1S. 804, and Place 
v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1, to the effect that the failure •of the 
Writ of Execution to require the satisfaction of a 
judginent .out of the attached property makes the Writ 
of Execution void. The ~section of the statute involved 
in that case is 645 ·of the New York Civil Practice Act 
formerly Se-ction 1370 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
and is as follows : 
'' vVhere a warrant of attachn1ent issued in 
the action has been levied by the sheriff, the 
execution n1ust substantially require the sheriff 
to satisfy the judgment, as follows : 
1. Where the judgment-debtor is a non-
resident, or a f•oreign corporation, and the sum-
Inons was served upon his or it, without the state, 
or otherwise than personally, pursuant to an 
-order ,obtained- for that purpose, and t'he judg-
ment-debtor has not appear·ed in the action; ·out 
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of the personal property attae.hed, and, if that is 
insufficient, out of the real property attached. 
:?. In any other case, ·Out of the personal 
property attarhed: and, if that is insufficient, out 
of the perS'oual prop·erty of the judg1nent-debtor; 
if both are insufficient out ~of the real property 
attached; and, if that is insufficient, out of the 
real propert3~ belonging to him at the tilne when 
the judgment 'Yas docketed in the clerk's office 
of the county or at any time thereafter.'' 
New York also has a section regarding exeeution 
against property generally "Then no attachment has. 
been issued. That section is 643 of Civil Practice Act 
and is as follo,\"~s : 
''An execution against property, if the judg-
ment-roll is not filed in the clerk's office of the 
eounty to \vhich it is issued, 1nust specify the 
time "Then the judgn1ent was docketed in that 
county. Except in a case where special provision 
is otherwise made by law, it must substantially 
require the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of 
the personal property of the judgment-debtor; 
and~ if sufficient personal property cannot be 
found, out of the real property belonging to him 
at the tin1e when the judgment vvras docketed in 
the elerk's office of the county or at any time 
thereafter. '' 
In the case of Place v. Riley the action had been 
·Commence.d against a non-resident by attachment. The 
case might be distinguished on the ground that the case 
had been comn1enced by attachn1ent rather than by per-
sonal ·service. However, the obj·ection to the Writ of 
Execution w·as the failure to provide for the sale of 
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unattached personal property before the sale of attached 
real property. The Court ~said: 
''It commanded the sheriff to collect the judg-
ment out of the attached p·ersonal property of the 
judgment-debtor, and if that was insufficient, out 
.of his attached real property, whereas the case 
was one under the seeo-nd subdivision of Section 
1370, by which the execution must go, first against 
the attached personal property, ,second against 
the other personal property of the judgment 
debtor, and lastly against the attached real prop-
·erty. '' 
The Court made the further statement: 
"The statute is peremptory that executions 
in the cases specified 'must require' the sheriff 
to satisfy the judgment in the way pointed ~out. 
The evident intention· of the second subdivision 
of the s-ection was to prevent res-ort to the real 
·estate of an absconding or c~oncealed debtor, for 
the satisfaction of a judgment obtained in an 
action in which an attachment had been issued 
and levied upon his real estate, until after the 
remedy against his personal property, both at-
tached and unattached, had been exhausted. This 
is in accordance with the general policy of the 
law, rounded upon reasons less forcible perhaps 
no'v than formerly, but which it is nevertheless 
within the discretion of the legislature to main-
tain.'' 
We see that the objection of the Court was not the 
failure to require the Sheriff to sell the property at-
tached but the failure to require the sale of unattached 
pers.onal prnperty prior to the ,sale of real property. 
·The Court also emphasizes the fact that the statute uses 
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the word "must". The Utah statute says ''shall''. That 
the New York Court does not consider a general exe-
cution void for failure to require the sale of attached 
property is show·n in the case •of Thomas v. Bogert, 
reported in 33 Hun. 11. In that case an attachment 
had been issued and after judgment a general execution 
'vas issued in which no mention of the a;tt.achment was 
made. After the sale the attorney for the Plaintiff 
attempted to countermand the first execution and hold a 
new sale. The present action was brought to redeem the 
property from the first sale, which the C;ourt held bind-
ing and could not be countermanded by the Plaintiff's 
attorney. The question before the Court is stated in the 
following language : 
''It is insisted, however, that the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to judgment, because the first 
execution, under which the sale was made and 
of "\vhich the redemption is predicate, was invalid, 
for the reason that the execution was a general 
one and was unauthorized hy the statute.'' 
That the general execution which failed to refer to 
the attachment was not void is made .clear by the fol-
lowing statement by the Oourt: 
"It thus appears that the sale which took 
place under the first execution was binding upon 
the plaintiff, the defendant in the executi~on not 
having interposed any objection, and that the 
plaintiffs' testator being the grantee of the judg-
ment debtor, took the proper steps to redeem." 
The case of Gilman v. Tucker which was decided by 
the Superior Court of N·ew York City followed the case 
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of Place v'. Riley without regard to the reason given 
for the ~decision. Being decided by a court inferior to 
the ·courts deciding the other two New Y,ork cases, it 
cannot he the law of New York. 
It is interesting to note that the annotator of Gil-
berts' Civil Practice (N. Y.) Volume 1, 19'22, cites the 
ca,se of ·Thomas v. Bogert as being the present law on the 
question of whether or not a general execution is void 
if it fails to mention the attachment, rather than the 
New York City cas·e of Gilman v. Tucker. (See Annota-
tion to sec. 645) . 
The case of Swift v. Agnes, 33 Wis. 228, makes the 
following statement in regard to a statute which pro-
vides for a general. execution and a special execution 
when property is attached: 
''·Constru~ng these statutes together (and 
certainly they are in pari materia and should be 
so construed)' we are of the opinion that it is 
optional wi tb the judgrnen t creditor, in an action 
wherein the property of his debtor has been at-
tached, to issue a special or limited execution, 
merely directing that the attacihed property he 
sold, or to issue an execution in the ordinary 
form, with the addition thereto of a special direc-
tion for the sale of the attached property.'' 
In Miss,ouri it ·has .been ~held that a failure to comply 
with a statute does not make the execution void. How-
ever, the Mis-souri law is the reverse of the U tab la~w in 
that where personal .service is had on the defendant and 
a general judgment i~s entered, the statute says that the 
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execution must be against all the property of the defend-
ant \Yhether it is attached or not. The reason for the 
rule appears t.o be that the defendant may be p·ermitted 
to surrender other property for the purpose of g.atisfy-
ing the judgment. There miglht also he thir·d parties 
interested in claims against the property attached so 
as to make it advisable to sell other prop·erty. In the 
cases of Krit.zer v. Sm.ith, 21 Miss.ouri 296, and Wamsley 
v. Snotc, 53 S. W. (2d) 258, it was held that a failure to 
comply \Yith the statute did not render the execution void. 
That the form of the writ is not grounds for collateral 
attack, see 21 Am. Jur. 259, Sec. 521. 
We submit that the failure to comply with subdi-
vision (3) of 'Section 104-37-2 is a~t most an irregularity 
which is not subject to collateral attack. Also tha·t it 
would be proper to conrstrue the subdivision to apply 10nly 
to actions where no personal judgment has been taken. 
That in cases where a. p·erson·al judgment is taken the 
matter should be optional with the plaintiff. We call 
attention to Sec. 88-2-2, R. S. U. 1933, which pr·ovides: 
,., The rule of the common lav; that statutes 
in derogation thereof are to be strictly cons·trued 
has no application~ to the statutes of this state. 
The statutes establis'h the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their proV'isi.ons atJtt-d all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally co'Jib.Strued with a vietv to eft ect 
the ob,jects of the statutes and to promote ju-st~ce. 
Whenever there is any variance bet'\veen the rules 
of equity and the rules of common la.\v in refere,nee 
to the same matter the rules of equity shall 
prevail.'' 
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WAS THERE A. PROPER NOTICE OF SALE? 
(18-ee pages 49 to 53 o·f Ap.pellants' Brief). 
It is contended by the Appellants tha.t because the 
Notice of Sale- stated that the sale would be held on the 
28th and the Return shows a sale .of the property on the 
29th, there i's no proper noti,ce. We believe that there 
is a complete answer to this objection in that t'he s~ale 
is not subject to collateral attack because of a defective 
notice. The following statement is taken from 21 Am. 
Jur. 258, Sec. 519: 
''' The general rule is that if there is . any 
·ground for relief against an execution, such re-
lief must be sought in the ·Qiriginal ~ause and not 
by a new and independent proceedim:g.'' 
T.hat a judicial sale is not subject to collateral a:ttack be-
causH of a, defective notice see Annot(l)tion in 1 A. L. R. 
at Page 1440. The portion of this annotation a.t Page 
1441 dealing with .the time of s·ale has to. do with tbe time 
of s·ale required in the statute .and not to the time stated 
in the notice. 
We believe that ·this is a complete answer to a ppel-
lant 's obje·ction. However the plaintiffs in C~ase No. 1410 
Civil assumed the burden of bringing out the facts with 
respe-ct to the Sheriff's Sale and p·roved a po,stponement 
from January 28th to the- 29th. Such proof was unne·c-
-essa.ry. This is s-o not only for the reason that the notice 
of sale may not be attacked in a collate·ral proceeding, 
but the She-riff's R~etu·rn, so fa.r as its recitals go, is con-
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elusive in a. collateral proceeding. The Sheri:ff''S Return 
is a.s follows, (see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) : 
''I hereby certify that under and by virtue 
of the 'vithin and hereto annexed vvrit of execution 
by me received ·On the 19th day of December, 1934, 
I did on the 21st da.y of January, 19a5, levy on 
the property hereinafter described and noticed 
the same for sale as the law directs, and on the 
29th day of J a.nuary, 1935, at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. 
·of said day a.t the front door of t1l·e County C:ourt 
House in Heber City, Wasatch c·ounty, Utah, the 
time and place fixed for said s:ale, I did attend 
and offer for sale at public auction for lawful 
money of the United States, the property de-
scribed as follows:'' (Here follows a description 
of the property): 
''and sold the whole of the sa.me to A. C. Moulton 
:a;nd E. Dewey MDulton the within named plain-
tiffs, for the sum .o.f $100.00, ,said purchasers being 
the highest and only bidders and said sum being 
the highest and only bid made, and I have given 
said purchase-rs a certificate of sale, and I here-· 
with return s·aid writ partly satisfied: to-wit, in 
the sum of $100.00. '' 
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
There is nothing irregular appearing on the face of 
the return. 
The following is a statement of the rule in 21 Am. 
Jur. 247, Sec. 496: 
"As a. general rule a sheriff's return of exe-
·cutio'n sufficient on its face is regarded as con-
clusive, so that it may not be contradicted in col-
lateral proceedings for the purpose of invalida.t-
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ing the officer's acts or defeating rights acquired 
under them by averments to the contrary or by 
parol ·evidence in prnof of such averments, before 
the return is vacated by due course of la vv. '' 
See also, Jon1es on Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 1907 (2nd Ed.) 
We believe that the plaintiffs proved a sufficient 
title to the promiss-ory note by introducing in evidence 
the S1heriff's Return. 
A·ssuming, however, that the appellants could prop-
erly atfack the notice of ·sale or ·Sheriff's Return in thi·s 
proceeding, the evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs 
cured any defect or irregularity. We call attention of 
the Court to Section 19-19-12 which provides: 
"The Retur;n of the Sheriff upon process or 
notice is prima facie evidence of the fa:cts in sueh 
return stated. '' 
We believe· this section has to do with proceedings in 
whidh there is a direct attack and does no.t by iillferenc.e 
permit a collate·r.al attack. Assuming further that the 
Appellants have destroyed the prin1a fa:cie .case of reg-
ularity of the sale by .showing a notiee of sale to he held 
on January 28th, the defe·ct w:as properly cured by plain-
tiffs' evidenee. The sheriff testified as to the facts with 
regard to t~he postpone1nent of sale (Tr. 12, 18, Ab. 115, 
116). We quo1te fron1 the case of Huish v·. Fenkel, 85 
.Utah 253, 39 Pa.c. (2d) 330, at page 263 of the Utah 
Report, cited by Appella;n ts : 
"·But \vhen the statute does not 1nake the of-
ficer's return conclusive or the only evidence of 
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the manner of executing prO'eess, there seen1s to 
be no reason why the facts may not be s'hown by 
other competent evidenre provided it is not at-
tempted to contradict the return.'' 
The sheriff's testimony offered by the plaintiffs in 
no 'Yay im·peaches his o'Yn return or contradicts the 
same. He n1erel~~ sho,Ys an additional fact n.ot appear-
ing in the return that he gave notice that t:he sale would 
be held on January 28th at ten o'-clock and that he p-ost-
poned the _same to January 29th at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. 
The rule is clearly stated in 3 Banoroft Code Prac-
t~ce ood Remedies, page 2656, as follows: 
''The return of the sheriff of his official acts 
under an execution is presumptively true. F:acts 
o1nitted from the return may be supplied by parol 
evidence not inconsistent therewith.'' 
Citing Brusie v. Gates, 80 Cal. 462, 22 Pa.c. 284; Davis v. 
Baker, 72 Cal. 494, 14 Pac. 102; Ritter v. 800/n!Ytell, 11 
Cal. 238, 70 Am. D·ec. 775. 
We call attention to the further fact that the S1l·eriff 
te·stified that the sale wa.s postponed at the request of 
J. Rulon niorgan, one of the attor.neys of record for the 
defendants, a.nd the court so found (Tr. 12, Ab. 115, 85). 
The Sheriff might also be allozyed to contradict a return 
vvhere he is out of office so that an amended return could 
not be made by 1lim. That the 'Sheriff at the time of the • 
trial was out of office see Tr. 35. 
·Our position is: ·Tha.t the Sheriff's Returrn is regular 
on its face and n1ay not be collaterally attacked. That the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
failure to give proper notice -of sale may not be collateral-
ly a1ttacked. That assuming an attack may he made in 
this proceeding it is prop·er to permit the Sheriff to· add 
addi tiona I fa~c.ts by oral testim-ony showing that the sale 
was postponed. That the postponement having been 
made at the request of J. Rulon M,organ, the attorney for 
the defendant in that case, they may not be hea.rd to 
object. That since the Sheriff's term ·of office has 
terminated the real facts may be shown by oral testimony 
without an amendment of the Return, even though suc.h 
testimony might contradict the Return already filed. It 
is, of course, clear that there is no contradiction in this 
case. 
IS THE TITLE OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AFFECTED BY THE 
AMOUNT OF TH·E CONSIDERATION BID AT THE SALE? 
(See pages 53 and 54 o.f Appellant·s' Brief). 
N·o authority is cited by appellants that mere inade-
quacy of the amount bid inval1da.tes a. sale. The Utah 
case of National Realty Bailes Co. v. Ewing, 55 Ut. 438, 
186 P;ac. 1103, holds contrary to appellants' contention. 
The teS"fimony of A. C. M·oulton was that he told Mr. 
!Stanley to start the bid at $100.00 (Tr. 39!5, .Ah. 207). 
Unless necessity required, who would have hid more for 
this note under t~1 .. e circumstances? There had been a 
release of the mo.rtgage filed of re·cord the day previous. 
• There was a new mortgage of $5,000.00 to M:orga.n & 
Morgan and eonveyance of the property recorded 
on the same day but prior to the sale. Josie, 
or her attorney in fact, by instruments prepared by her 
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attorney, had done everything· possible to throw doubt 
on the validity of the note. An extensive law suit has 
resulted therefron1. The note may hecome valueless if 
appellants' eontentions are sustaiined on this appeal. If 
the full amount of the judgment had ·been paid the judg-
ment would ha.Ye been satisfied and upon the determina-
tion of the invalidity of the note the plaintiffs' judgment 
would ha.Ye been lost. On· the other hand, the plaintiffs 
have offered to do equity. The following statement wa.s 
made in -open court on behalf of plaintiffs' prior to the 
trial, ( Tr. 4, 5) : 
''MR. CANNON: I would like to state that 
the obligation out of which this transa~ction has 
arisen is an oibliga tion of J,osie Baird ·Giles and J. 
Harold Giles in the form of promiss·ory notes to 
the plaintiffs in this case: That we took judgment 
on those promissory notes. And I w.ould like to 
state that if we could be paid the amount of the 
judgment, we don't care to insist upon any fur-
ther payments, if we '\vould receive our money 
under the judgment, plus interest. 
,,, THE OOiURT : Five thousand s.ome odd 
dollars. 
''MR. C·AN1NON: Tha.t is the principal. And 
we would not insist upon deficiency judgments on 
the fifteen thousand dollar ·note that we have at-
tached, if we can be permitted to foreclose the 
mortgage upon the farm. So that we are n.nt in 
this case trying to reap more than the am.ount 
.of our original judgment, if we can secure that 
amount. 
'·' JUD·GE HAN·S·EN: ·That is, of <;ourse not 
in your pleadings. Y·ou are seeking the am.~unt 
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of your judgment and $750 attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
''MR. C·.ANN·.QN: That is correct. But we 
at this time .offer, upon the payment of the orig-
inal judgment', to release Josie Baird and J. Har-
old Gile~s from the deficiency which we now have 
against them, and also Vern or Baird a~nd his. wife 
on the fifteen thousand dollar note. We are not 
seeking to reap anything additional t'han that 
~amount.'' 
The decree ]n the ease now before this court does 
not provide for any deficiency judgment against Vernor 
E. Baird, the signer of the $15,000.00 note. The amount 
of the judgment taken is not $15,000.00, but merely the 
amount of the judgment in the action by A. C. Moulton 
and E. De-wey M·oulton against Josie Baird Giles and J. 
Harold Giles plus interest and eosts. There is not even 
any attorneys fees added for the foreclosure of the mort-
gage herein sued upon. 
LS THERE A VALID HOMIDSTEAD CLAIM? 
(See pages 55 to 67 of Ap·pellants' Brief). 
Just what position Appellants wish to take in regard 
to the claim of homestead is not clear. They are ap-
parently taking three different positions which are more 
or less inconsistent. In ·c:a.se No. 1'2·6!6 a claim was filed 
to a homestead in the water stoek alone by Josie B!a;ird 
Giles Smith and the Executor of Elizabeth J. Baird's 
Estate. In case N·o. 1410 the claim is made to a home-
stead right in the promissory .note apparently for the 
!benefit of Josie. A further elaim is made to a homestead 
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right in the real estate .on behalf of the E·xecutor of the 
Estate of Elizabeth J. Baird (!See petition in c:ase No. 
1266 at Pa,ges 22~24 of the abstract and in paragraphs 
6 and 7 of the petition in case No. 1410 a~t page 72 of the 
a.bstract). Appellants are not merely trying to straddle 
the fence, but in this instanc.e th~e homestead right is 
being shifted to three different pieces of property,-the 
water stock, the n.ote and the real prop,erty. It must 
necessarily be Josie's homestead right that forms the 
basis for all three of these claims. 
We think that clearly there is no right of homestead 
in the certificates of water stock as claimed in case No. 
1266. The statute quoted by Appellants SeC'tion 38-0-4, 
R. S. U. 1933, provides that the water .st.o~ck, 
"shall be exempt from execution to the extent 
that such rights a.nd interest are necess·arily em-
ployed in supplying water to the homestead for 
domestic and irrigating purposes.'' 
Josie conveyed the property, on which· this water stock 
has been used, to Vern or Baird in 19'29. She has never 
since had title to the same and it therefore could not be 
her homestead. Since she has had no real estate since 
1929 she ·Cannot claim she has used water on it since that 
time. Her ·claim in case No. 12~66 is further answered by 
the fact that she consented to the pledge of the water stock 
to the bank. ·The Trial~C~ourt .so found. We rely upon the 
argument on that phase o.f the case hereafter set forth, 
' to s:how that she consented to the pledge of the stock. We· 
further call attention to the fact that the Petition :flo·r 
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homesite~ad in case No. 1266 does not ·state th·at J.osie was a 
resident of Utah, eX!cept at the time the certificate of stock 
was delivered to the Ba.nk of Heber Oity. The evidence 
shows tha:t the stock was de·livered to, the Bank in 1929 
('Tr. 179, A b .. 150). Under the petition in that case there 
is therefore insufficient showing as to residence to eu~ 
title Josie to a homestead. 
·The materi~al facts with regard to the claim of home-
~stead in ease No. 1410 are important, and w,e thereffo,re 
make the following statement in rega.rd thereto: Josie 
sold and c.onveyed the only real estate which :she then or 
ha,s since owned in the ,state of U ta:h to her brother, 
Vern or E. Baird, ·O'ctober 10, 19,29· and took a promissory 
note in the su~m ·Of $15,000.00 in payment therefor. It is so 
pleaded by the plaintiff and expressly admitted iby the 
defendant. It is admitted throughout the testimony that 
Vernor Baird went into possessi~on of the prop;erty and 
remained in p'a:ssession for several years. The title· never 
revested in Jlosie. Afte-r the a:tta·chment and levy of 
execution on the promissory note Vern or exe:cuted a deed 
to Elizabeth J. B:aird. Prior to the execution of such 
deed a $5,000.00 real estate mortgage was given to Mor-
gan & Morgan. The mortgage which se·cures the promis--
sory note held by the Plaintiff has priority over the con-
veyaalce hy Vern or to Eliza1heth. Under these facts we 
can see no pos.sible reason why Elizabeth J. Baird or 
the Exeeutor of her estate has any possible .claim t10r a 
homestead based upon the purchase of the property from 
Josie Baird Giles. . 
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While it appears th~at the pleading filed probably 
claims a. hom~stead in the real estate rather than in the 
promissory note, 've will nevertheless discuss the ques-
tion .of a homestead claim in the note as the proc.eed·s of 
the sale of the homestead. It is said at page 62 of Ap-
pella;nts' Brief that in contemplation of law, Vernor 
never ·parted 'Yith the note, in which event it would be 
idle to say that J-osie had r.eceived the proceeds of the 
sale of the farm. When it is admitted by pleadings as 
well as eviden·ce that the n·ote was ''executed and de-
livered'' it cannot be said that in contemplation of law 
she did inot receive the note. The evidence shows and 
the court found that Mr. Stanley never refused to deliver 
the note to J-osie and that she never demanded it from 
him prior to. the time the Sheriff took it into his P·OS·ses-
sion. Supposing Vernor Baird when he took the mort-. 
gage and had it recorded had als-o taken the promissory 
note and delivered it to a B·ank where Josie could get it 
a.s s·lie wished 1 Wio.uld this Court hold that she had 
never received the note~ The note was at all times en-
forcible ag~nst Vernor. The parties so recognized in 
their own testimony when they claimed to have had an 
understandi,ng in 1.933 that the promissory note W·ould be 
released. Under our sta.tute the note is exempt £or only 
one year from the date of sale. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that Mr. 
Stauley did refuse to deliver the note to Josie, this c-ould 
not alter the situation. She had legal title to. the note 
and was eintitled to enfor·ce its payment. If Mr .. Stanley 
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had been guilty of conversion of the note it -could in no 
way unravel the completed transaction of the sale of the 
pr,o:perty and payment therefor. Josie's remedy in the 
event of wrongful withholding of the note would be 
against him and not a. claim against Vernor. 
'The homestead ·claim is further defeated for the rea-
son that no claim of homestead was made at .or prior to 
the time of the sale. Josie had notice of the sale as the 
Writ of Attachment was Herved on her on July 7, 1934, 
more than six months prior tor the date o.f sale. (1See the 
!Sheriff's Retur;n in Pilaintiffs' Exhilbit. 1). She there-
after. filed a Demurrer in the a:ction and her a tt.orney re-
ceived a not~ce of the sale on January 26, 19e:5 (Tr. 39, 
A b. 1'20). Her attorney testified that he wa;s in the 
Courthouse on January 28, 19'35, apparently to attend 
the sale ('Tr. 40, A b. 120). He re:corded numer;ous docu-
ments which showed a very clear knowledge a.s to what 
was going on. No claim of homestead has been made by 
any party until nearly .five years after the Sheriff's sale. 
Liberal as this Court has been, no ca,se yet has held that 
a homestead may be claimed after Sheriff's sa1e and the 
complete vesting of title in the purchas·er. We suggest 
t'he follio,wing illustration to show the evil ·of any rule 
which would pernrit the claim of homestead after com-
pleted sale. 
Supp.osing ''X;'' owes a. $1,000.00 note and that he 
is a wealthy man owning $100,000.00 worth of real prop-
erty in several pa.r·cels. The owner of the note sues ''X'', 
rec;o,vers judgment and levies upon one of the numerous 
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tracts of land O\vned by ., X". A sale is held, the prop-
erty purchased by the ~holder of the note, or a third partr 
a~nd the judgment is satisfied. After the sale is completed 
"X'' then says: \' N" o, I an1 the head of a fa1nily, I am 
entitled to a homestead exemption. I make my claim of 
hon1estead ·On the property \vhich you haYe sold. The 
sale is void and I am entitled to recover in an action of 
ejectment.'' The rule as to \vhen a claim of homestead 
shall be made cannot be different vvhether the debtor 
owns one or a hundred pieces of pr·operty. No one knows 
at the time of the sale \vhat the defendant 1nay own. In 
pressing this argument as to the failure to make a. claim 
of homestead we do not, of course, admit tha.t a home-
stead could have been claimed in this c.a.se at the time of 
the ·sale. The claim of homestead, however, come's at a 
time when Josie has long since removed from the State 
of Utah and has been a resident in the State of California 
for several years. The stitpulation of facts wit'h regard 
to the homestead admits that she was a resident of Utah 
only until 19'3-5 (A:b. 77). None of the ca!ses cited by 
Appellants go so far a.s to allow a homestead under the 
fa.cts before the Court. . 
·The case of Utah B-uilders' Sup·ply Comp·any v. 
Ga1'"dn.er, 86 Utah 250, 39 Pac. (2d) 327, Petition for 
Rehearing, 86 Utah 257, 42 P·ac. (2,d) 989, indicates 
that a claim must be made at least prior to the .Sheriff's 
sale. In the case of Payson Exchange Savings Bank v. 
Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P-ac. 598, the Court does make 
a statement that the sale of home·stead is absolutely void. 
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However, there Wail~ a claim of homestead ma.de in that 
case prior to sale and therefore the .statement of the 
Cour~ goes no further than the case presented .. 
As to the amount of the homestead in the event it 
·is allowed, ·Appellants claim the amount s'hall be cal-
culated as if there were a husband, wife and minor child. 
The date of the interlocutory deeree of divor.ce in the 
suit by J1o,sie against her hushand was July 1;6, 19·34. The 
decree therefore,. became final January 16, 19'35 and sale 
of the note took place. January 2'9, 1g.35. S.ee Sheriff's 
Return in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Appellants are there-
fore in error when t'hey state at page 59 of their B~rief 
that they were husband and 1vife at the time the note 
was sold under exe'cution sale. If a homestead is allowed 
it can be for only the .$2,000.00 £or the head of the family 
,a.nd $300.00 for the child, but we most earnestly urge 
that a homestead, in any amount, is not allowable in this 
case. 
Having answered all of the contentions of the Ap-
pellants affecting the rights of the plaintiffs in Case 1410 
Civil, we respectfully submit that the de-cision of the 
Trial C1nurt should be affirmed. 
ARGU·MENT REGARDING LIEN OF THE· BANK OF HEBER CITY 
AND ITS SU,C.CESSORS. 
(:See pages 13 to 2·5 of Appellants' Brief). 
As heretofore pointed out, the ruling of the Court 
in favor of the Bank of Heber City giving it a first lien 
on the water stock was adverse to all of the other in-
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terested parties in the action. A. C. Moulton and E. 
De,vey Moulton, howey·er, have not appealed from that 
ruli.ng-. The Bank had filed a suit on the note of J. 
Harold Giles in \Yhich Ans"\\.,.ers "-.:ere filed by Josie and 
Harold. This was case No. 1266. Practically the same 
issues were raised by a cross-complaint in the suit on 
the $15,000.00 note, this being- ca.se No. 1410. The main 
issue on this phase of the case, was whether Josie au-
thorized the pledge to the banlr. 
It is our contention that complete authority in 
Harold to deal with the property of Josie, in the manner 
in which he did deal with it, is shown by the circum-
stances under which they conducted their business. 
Examination of the testimony will show the prop-
erty and business status existing between Josie Baird 
Giles and J. Harold Giles, her ~usband. In 19'26 Josie 
inherited both real and personal property from her 
father's estate (Tr. 264, .A:b. 169). 
William H. Baird, Josie's brother, testifying on her 
behalf, said: 
''Josie got around $3,000.00 more than her share. 
She got some sheep. Josie got s~ome s.heep he-
cause they 'vere building up a business. Josie and 
her husband were trying to get a start in the 
sheep business, and so they received some sheep 
instead of mother. They had the range lands and 
wanted to go in the sheep business. They went 
into the ~sheep business for a short time and then 
the business ble·w up.'' (Ab. 143) 
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Josie and Harold were married in 19'24 and were divorced 
in 119:34. Concerning their relations during marriage, 
Josie testified: 
' ' During that time I did nort know very much 
about my husband's business. He had tw·o dif-
ferent businesses. He had the sheep first and 
then the ranch. He had the sheep when I in-
herited them from my father. ·That was in 1926 
when the e~sta.te was divided. He managed the 
sheep. I do not know what he was doing with 
the sheep or know anything ahout the money he 
wa.s getting. At that time, he was providing for 
me. I think .he had a checking acc.ount, whi1ch I 
was p·ermitted to draw against. That e;ondition 
did not exist during all the time I was married to 
Mr. Giles. We traded the ranch in 1929 and sold 
the sheep. I think it was in O-ctober of that year. 
From October, 1929, Mr. Giles was farming the 
Lake Creek farm. That fa.rn1 belonged to me. 
He didn't earn much money on the farm. I knew 
he borrowed money fr,om the bank but did not 
kno\v how much. I do not know that the borrowed 
money wa.s used ror our living, but we lived on-
I drew on the money f.or one year, that is, until 
.1930. '' (Ab. 169) 
IShe further testified : 
'·'After we traded the farm, we kept the sheep 
for awhile. Then they were sold. I think prob-
ably we sold the sheep before the farm * * * 
I had the sheep before I got the farm. Harold had 
charge of the .sheep until I got the farm. Mr. 
,Giles took care of the sheep while they were on 
the . farm. * * * I think n~o~w we sold the 
sheep before we sold the farm.'' (Ab. 170) 
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She testified further: 
"I stated that I received a!hout $4,000.00 frou1 
the sheep. 'That was the sheep that Harold Giles 
"\Yas running in 19·26 to the fail of 1929. I am not 
sure but tha.t \Ye sold the sheep before the farm. 
It could have 'been in 19'28 when we sold them. We 
paid that money to the Bank of Heber City. That 
is the best recoJlection I have now. I know we 
paid the money \Ye got from the sheep to the Bank 
of Heber City. The money was paid on the debts 
we had acquired, that is, my husband and I. * 
* * I didn't know how much money Harold 
l1ad borrowed from the bank. ·The debt had to be 
settled, and I ''as willing to. use the money for 
that purpose. I do not know what p·art of the 
twenty-six hundred vvent to the bank. I didn't 
turn the money over to the bank. My husband 
took ~are of that. I gave him the money.'' ( Ab. 
171-172) 
On this point, she testified further: 
''I do not kno.w how my husband used the money. 
He c.ould have used it in a cheeking account. I 
don't kno\v. 1 don't recall ever asking him how 
he used the money. I really don't know whether 
he used any of it in a checking account. I went 
to the hank and had him cash some checks f,o~r 
me and wrote other ehecks. * * * 'There was 
no money in the ihank that he could have drawn 
against after 19'30. If there had been money after 
1930, I would have felt free to draw against that 
account." · (.Ab. 174) 
Notwith8tanding there w~as no money 1n the hank to 
draw :O•n after 19'30, still they •continued their joint busi-
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ness ventures. Wor example, see j.oint notes executed by 
them to the Moultons ,in 1931--..Complaint in E'xhibit 1. 
The hushand, Harold, made a .signilficant "Showing. 
In his sworn answer, respeeting the water certificates, 
he Haid: 
"D~efendant admits that said certificates of stock 
were in the name of defendant Josie Baird Giles 
and that said certificates of .sto~ck were endorsed 
in bla:nk .on the ha0k of said certificates by said 
defendant, Josie Baird ~Giles, a long time prior 
to this transaction.'' (iAfb. 12-13 )' 
The transfer referred .to was the pledging of the 
certifieates to the hank in 19·33. Hi~s answer further al-
leges (A h. 13) that the certinca tes were obtained by the 
bank in 1'9'33 by false representations and fraudulent 
conduct. 
When put on the stand to support his story. he testi-
fied, on his dire-ct examination, that. he delivered the 
stock to the bank in 19,29, not 1933, and that he did not 
know whether his wife had told him he might pledge them 
in 19:29 or not. 
·1;he undisputed re-cord shnws that the exa.ct date o.f 
the pledge was May 2'1, 1'9'2:9 ('Tr. 17'9, Ab. 150). This 
pledge is therefore prior to tlie sale of the land and water 
to Vern or. B:aird, and prior to the mo.rtgage back to Josie 
and prior to ·every other transaction mentioned in either 
ca.se. s.o the question, was Harold authoriz.ed to pledge 
the certificates, remains paramount. 
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His dirert testim-ony on the point is so brief that 
we quote it in full from the trans~cript. 
Questions by Judge Hansen: 
'· Q. Are you at this trial resisting the action 
against you J? 
''A. Why, I am resisting it against -my 'vife, nort 
against me. I don't care what they do to me. 
''Q. You did file an answer, through Mr. ~forgan, 
y;our attorney? 
"A. Yes. 
'' Q. I will ask you, Mr. ·Giles, if you now have an 
independent recollection of delivering to the 
bank of Heber ·City tw-o certificates of stock? 
''A y . 
. es, srr. 
'·'·Q. I "~ll show them to you so that JIOU will 
know which ones they are. One is marked 
Defendants' Exhibit G, Certificate No. 68, in 
·Cau~e No. 1266. Will you examine tfllat. 
The other is Defendants' Exhibit F, in case 
No. 1266. Let's see, they are each for 241/2 
shares, I believe' 
"A yr 
• _l_ es. 
''Q. Have you a recollecti·on no\v, Mr. Giles, as to 
when those certificates were delivered to the 
Bank of Heber City~ 
''A. Well, I don't kno\v exactly. It "\Vas some time 
in '29. 
"Q. You think it "\Yas some time in '29. At the 
time you delivered those two certificates to 
the Bank ;o.f Helber City, did your wife Josie 
Giles tell you that you might so deliver them 
to the Bank of Heber City' 
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''A. I don't know. 
'·' Q. Have you any recollection about that nowf 
,, A. N 
...tl.. o. 
J'UD~GE HAN.SE!N: "I think that is all.'' (Tr. 
293-4) 
·The foregoing testimony 0onstitutes all the direct 
resistance put up by H·arold to the case against his wife. 
The iCircumstanees under which he delivered the water 
certifiea.tes to the bank, ho-vvever, were brought out on 
cross-examination, and as abstracted by his counsel, 
read as foll:o.-yvs: 
"I delivered the certificates to the hank in 
1'929. I remember that. I received possessiion 
of the certifi-cates at the hon1e. I just took them 
to the ha!nk. I wa.s in the habit of dealing with 
1ny \vife 's property. I never had any -conversa-
tion with my -vvife about dealing with her prop-
erty. I handled the property that she inherited. 
I talked to her ·s-ome about the property .. I heard 
her testify about drawing on the account and she 
did dra\\T on the acc.oun t. I managed the farm. 
·T.here was water on the farm and the water \Vas 
represented by the ~certificates. I have seen the 
eertific.ates at the hon1e. I am not certain when 
the certifi·cates can1e into ·my \Yife 's posse·ssion, 
·but I think it was some time in 1927. I had the 
·certificates several times I guess. I do nl()t know· 
that she ever had kno\vledge that they were in my 
possession. 'They \Yere just around the home. I 
don't know that I ever had them in n1y possession 
to her kno\vledge. I had no discussion with her 
at the time I took the certificates to the bank. 
I don't remember whet.her she \vas home at that 
tin1e or not. I took the certificates to the hank 
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because I thought 've were in business partner-
ship-:'\vas married, and I was doing her business. 
I thoug·ht 've "~ere partners. The signature on 
Exhibit F looks like her sig11ature and I would 
say it is her sig·nature. 'The signature ·on Exhibit 
iG does not look like her signature. It was there 
when I took it to the ba_nk. I do not know who 
wrote that signature. I d·on '·t think it is mY '\vrit-
ing, but it could be. It isn't my ,vife 's handwrit-
ing· a.ny,-ray." (Ab. 175-6) 
The reco:r:d, a.s made by the defenda:nts thems.elves, 
esta·blishes a business and p1~operty status between Josie 
and Harold Giles, \Yhich is so clear and c.onvincing th~t 
none can mistake its existence and character. 
William Baird, the broth·er, says that Josie and 
Harold were in business together. That Josie got some .. 
sheep for the express purpose of building up a business. 
That they had range land a.nd water and were in fact 
in the sheep business together . 
. J1oisie called the business her husband's business-
the .sheep ·business and the ranch business, to which she 
contributed both the sheep and the ranch. What he con-
tributed in money or property does not appear, but he 
did give his whole time, a.ttention, and skill to the man-
agement of the business. There was no provis~o~n f.or 
wages ·or eompensation for Harold's .services. The pro-
ceeds from the business and the pr.operty used in the 
business were used indisc.riminately by Josie and H:arold 
to pay their living expenses and their husiness debts. 
J.osie gave him an ahs,o.lute free hand. She did not 
know what he wa.s doing with the sheep or the ranch or 
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the money ~e was getting. She was content to know 
that .he was providing for her and allowing her to draw 
against the hank account. When it came to selling and 
trading .and paying business ~o·bligations, Josie's charac-
teristic remarks were: ''We traded the farm;'' ''We sold 
the sheep;'' ''We sold the farm;'' ''We paid the bank;'' 
''We paid the debt my husband and I had acquired.'' 
It was, therefore, no idle conclusion on Harold's 
part, when he said : ''I thought we were partners.'' 
The record is replete with evidence of Josie's ac-
quiesoence in Harold's borrowing fr1om the hank, which 
she .treated as her own obligation. 
·Even her counsel at the trial, by the form of their 
questions, trearted Harold's obligations as Josie's ob-
ligatitons. Beginning on page 96 of the transcript, Josie 
is testifying to the sale of a house. These questions and 
answers appear : 
''·Q. What did you do with the money you re-
~ceived from that house~ 
'''A. We had to pay bank bills with it. 
'·' Q. What bank did you owe~ 
'·'A. He'ber City Bank.'' ('Tr. 9·6-97) 
See also Tr. 12·2 and 1!2:3. She testified that she sold 195 
ewes and 3 bucks and the money went for expenses, m0:st 
of it to the Bank of He~ber City ('Tr. 121, 122, 131, Ab. 
139, 141}. 
'' Q. Whose notes were they~ 
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'• A. ·They were notes my husband had signed for 
running the ibusiness. '' (Tr. 131) 
In view of all the foregoing transa~ctions, it is well 
nigh impossible to treat the handling of the water certi-
ficates as unauthorized. Josie drew most of the money 
that went into the hank ('Tr. 198, Ah. 153). Harold bor" 
rowed $1700.00, May 21, 1929, and made many renewals 
until the $25·50.00 note sued on was given in 1933. Harold 
Giles borrowed from the bank constantly from Septem-
ber, 1926, down to the time of the ple(J.ge agreement of 
May 21, 19'29, and some of the notes evidencing the in- . 
debtedness were signed by Josie. (See Tr. 249, Ab. 165- · 
166 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13 introduced by stipula.tion). 
During the time when Josie admits Harold wa.s running 
the business, the notes generally were signed by Harold 
and not by Josie. The certificates as pledged were en-
dorsed. Josie would not testify that the signature on 
Certificate N·o. 68 was in Harold's handwriting ('Tr. 260, 
2~61, .A!h. 168). On the question of the handwriting on 
the certifi·cates of stock, we submit that the signature 
on certificate No. 64 was placed there by Josie herself. 
ISee comparison with her signature given at the trial on 
Exhibit B-3 and her .signa.ture on the pleading~. The 
handwriting on certificate Nlo. 68 appear.s very likely to 
have been Harold's. He testi:fied that it might be his 
signature ('Tr. 299, Ab. 176). Compare his signature on 
Exhibit B-1, which is his promissory note sued on in case 
No. 1266, and his signa.ture on the pleadings. 
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Harold was asked whe~ther or not a.t the time tlie 
two certifieates were delivered to the bank his wife told 
him he could deliver the certificates. He stated, (Tr. 
294-2.9'9, Afb. 1715, 176): 
''A. I don't know.'' 
When asked how he got possession of the certificates, 
he stated: 
''A .. Why they were home, I just took them to the 
bank. 
'' Q. Were you in the habit :of dealing with your 
wife's property1 
"A. Y e·s. ' ' 
* * * * * * * 
'·'Q. Did you have the management of the prop-
erty tha't she inherited 1 
''A. Yes. 
''·Q. And you never talked with her about the 
m·a.nagement of the property 1 
"A. ·Oh, .some, but I don't know what she said. 
'·''Q. But you were the ma:nager, and you heard 
her testimony ho.w she drew on your ac-
count1 
"A.Y e.s. 
"Q. ·And that is the fact;is it1 
''A. Yes.'' 
* * * * * * * 
'' Q. You managed the farm did you~ 
"A. Yes." 
* * * * * * * 
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"Q ... A.nd 'vas there 'vater 'vith the f·arm? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Do you know whether or not that water was 
represented by any certificates'~ 
"A. Yes. 
'' Q. Had you seen the certificates o? 
' 'A. Yes. 
'·'·Q. Where had you seen them~ 
''A. Home.'' 
* * * * * * * 
"Q. In '2·7. Did you ever have them in your pos-
sessi:o:n ~ I mean did she ever deliver them 
over into your possession~ 
''A. I had them several times I guess. 
'' Q. With her knowledge~ 
''A. Well, I don't know if it was her knowledge. 
Just like you would .have anything else 
around home.'' 
* * * * * * * 
''Q. Then state under what cir,cumstance-s you 
took them, and by what right you took 
them.'' 
* * * * * * * 
''A. Well, I took them to the bank beeause I 
thought we were in business partnership, was 
married, and I was doing her :business. 
,,, Q. You thought you were partners~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. I will ask you to look at Defendants' Exhibit 
'F ', at the signature on .the hack thereof, and 
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ture. 
''A. It looks like her .signature. 
'·'Q. Would you say it is her signature? 
''lA. Yes.'' ('Tr. 29'5-299) 
Harold testified that while the signature on Certi-
ficate N·o. 68 did not look like her .signature it was on 
there when he took it to the hank ('Tr. 299, .&b. 176). 
Appellants seem to think that respondents rely upon 
estoppel to establish their right to the water as against 
J-osie Baird Giles. In this they are mistaken. Our case 
rests on clear principles of agency. 
The manner in which an agency may arise is clearly 
shown by the following authorities: 
,., Apparent authority, or ostensible authority, as 
it is also called, is that whi,ch, though not actually 
granted, the principal knowingly permits the 
.agent to exercise, or which he holds him out as 
possessing. Accordingly, .as defined by the Amer-
ican Law Institute, an appearent agent is one 
who, with or without authority, reasonably ap-
pears to third persons. to be authorized to act as 
the agent of another. 
''With respect to the derivation of the agent's 
apparent authority to begin with, the power and 
authority of an agent may safely he deemed by 
.persons dealing with him in good faith to be at 
least equal to the s-cope of the duties ordinarily 
conferred upon agents or agencies of that char-
acter. Apparent authority may also be, and often 
is., derived from a course of dealing or from the 
.fiact that a number of acts similar to the: one in 
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question "'rere assented to, ratified, or not dis-
avowed by the principal. The acquiescence of the 
principal in an extension of his authority by an 
agent in the transaction in question may be suffi-
eient to create the appearance of authority in the 
agent to do such act ; the acquiescence in, and 
consequent seope of, such authority, is to be de-
termined not only by what the .principal a-ctually 
does kn·O"\Y of the acts of the agent 'vithin the em-
ployment~ but also as to "\vhat he. should, in the: 
exercise of ordinary care and prudence, know the 
agent is doing in the agency transaction. In 
such ease, the appearance of authority is C!eated 
because of the fact that the third person is 
entitled to assume that the principal i.s cognizant 
.of the exercise of authority and would forbid 
it if it were unauthorized. As stated by the 
American Law Institute, ex-cept for the execution 
of instruments under .seal, or for the conduct of 
transactions required by statute to be authorize-d 
in a particular w.ay, apparent authority to do 
an act may be created by written or spoken words 
or any other conduct of the principal which, rea-
sona'bly interpreted, causes a third person to 
beli·eve that the prin,cipal consents to have the act 
dl(}ne on his behalf by the person purporting to 
aet for him. It is also to be noti·ced that the 
actual instructions of the principal to the agent 
do not govern the case, unless the p·erson dealing 
with him had notice or was put upon inquiry as 
to his real authority. Stated inclusively, then, 
the rule is that if a principal, acts or conducts 
his busine-ss, either intentionally or in a negligent 
manner~ or fails to disapprove of the agent's act 
or course -of action, and thereby leads the public 
t<> believe that his agent possesses authority to 
act or contract in the name of the prin({ipal, such 
principal is bound by the .acts of the agent within 
the ~scope of his apparent authority as to any 
,person who, upon th-e faith of such holding out~ 
believes, and has reasonable gr.ound to believe, 
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that the agent has ~such authority, and in good 
faith deals with him.'' ( 2 Am. J. pages 82-84, Sec. 
101-103). 
The following statement is taken from the case of 
Dierkes v. Hauxlvurst L.and Comp·wny, 80 N. J. Law 369, 
79 Atl. 361, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693 at Page 696: 
''And, as the fact of agency and the extent of 
the authority are matters peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the defendant, the .courts have not 
compelled plaintiff t~o call hostile witnesses to 
prove this element of his ·Case, but it may be in-
ferred from certain facts and circumstances that 
would fairly give rise· to such an inference. It 
is ·stated in 31 Cyc. L.aw & Proc. p. 1662, that, 
'as a general rule, the fact of agency cannot be 
established by proof of the acts of the pretended 
agent, in the absence ·of ·evidence tending to show 
the principal ',s knnwledge of such acts, or as.sent 
to them. Yet when the acts are of such a .char-
acter, and so ·continued, as to justify an inference 
that the principal knew of them, and would not 
have permitted the san1e if unauthorized, the 
acts themselves are competent evidence of 
agency.' This, it will he observed, is not on the 
theory of e~stop_pel in favor of a party contracting 
with the supposed agent hecause the .conduct of 
the principal amounted to holding him out as 
·such .agent, but is a rule of evidence, permitting 
a jury to find agency as a fact and not merely 
estoppel to ~deny it. And, while the question has 
arisen for the most part in contract cases, the 
rule has als-o been applied in actio-n of tort.'' 
See also Restatement of the Law of Agency, Volume 
1, Section 31, Comment on Sub-section (1): a; Section 
43, Comment a and ·C; Section 159, Oomment a, b, and e. 
~: 2.JLc.. 3- 'J..,3~, '4. 
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Assume for the purpose of arg·ument that Josie 
did not kno"\Y that Harold ""'"as pledging the "\Vater stock. 
\Yould she haYe objected had she kno,vn? There is noth-
ing in the evidence indicating that she would have. 
,, ... hen she did learn that the stock \Yas pledged she 
tnade nn effort to reclaim it. She merely sought to 
\"'erify the existenee of the pledge. 
The stock "\Yas pledged in 1929. Josie ,says that 
she learned about it first "~bile she was in California. 
She n1oved to California in 1931. ( Tr. 98; A b. 134). She 
made inquiries at the Bank of Heber City and at the 
Federal Reserve Bank "\Yhen she returned to Utah in 
1933. ,, ... e may now note the purpose of the inquiries 
as disclosed by the transcript beginning at page 254: 
''Q. ':Vhat did ~.Ir. Draper say to you at that 
time-? 
''A. He said they had the certificates all right, 
they had been presented to the hank. And 
I told him I didn't think so. An:d he said, 
well, he did. ..A .. nd I asked hil n if \Ye could 
see them, and he said they were in Salt Lake. 
I thought he said that the Federal Reserve 
bad taken them :over'' 
Inquiry was made at the Federal Reserve and request 
to see the certificates was made, but they were in a 
vault and not available. 
'' Q. After you receive-d that information, did you 
do anything further with respect to that 
matter, trying to find out about these certifi-
cates J? 
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''A. No. I. think that was the last ·time I tried 
to get to see them.'' (Tr. 255). 
By her own testimony Josie had nothing in mind 
except to see whether her husband had really pledged 
the .stock. 
Thus matters stood till August 14, 1934, when the 
Bank Commissioner filed an action seeking to foreclose 
the Bank's lien on the certificates. 
J·osie filed a separate answer in this case. (Ab. 7-11). 
To the allegations in the ·Complaint that Harold had 
pledged the eerti:ficate, she merely answered that she 
knew nothing about it. (Ab. 8). 
Following the institution of this action, the matter 
stood without ·anything being done until November 15, 
1938, when the Moultons brought a suit against Vernor 
Baird et al., seeking to foreclose a mortgage on certain 
real estate, including the water certifi·cates held by the 
bank. In this suit, Josie again filed a ~separate answer, 
(Ab. 50) but nowhere in it does she allege that Harold 
wrongfully pledged the ·certificates to the bank in May, 
1929. The Moultons alleged in their complaint, para-
graph 9 (Ab. 32) that Harold delivered the certificates 
to the bank after October 10, 1929, ''without the knowl-
edge or ·Consent of the rightful owners thereof.'' This 
allegation Josie admits, but makes no other allegation 
concerning the matter. The proof shows without dispute 
that Harold delivered the stock to the bank before Octo-
her 10, 1929, to wit, .on May 21, 1929. (Tr. 294; Ab. 175). 
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Josie knew at all thues after October, 1933, that the 
bank ~laimed a lien ~on the certiflcates, yet neither she 
nor her alleged successors in interest made any attempt 
to repossess the stock or to have the lien declared in-
valid by any court. 
The Moultons were the first to challenge the bank's 
lien in 1938. It was not until the case had been tried 
that Josie asked leave to re-open and challenge the 
bank's lien. This she did December 13, ·1939. (Ab. 22). 
In her petition for re-opening the case, she claims t·he 
water as ag·ainst all other claimants on the ground that 
it was used "to irrigate their homestead." "Their" 
meaning the homestead of Josie and Harold. Even h·ere 
she fails to allege that Harold was without authority 
to pledge the stock as of May 21, 1929, or at any other 
time. There she ~says : 
"J. Harold Giles was without authority to s-ell or 
hypothecate the same without the ·consent, ap-
proval and execution of a lien by your petitioner 
Josie Baird Giles.'' 
.When this allegation was made the court had already 
annouced from the bench his finding that she had con-
sented to and approved the pledge, so she alleged a new 
requirement to the validity of the Bank's lien, to wit: 
''Execution of a lien by'' her~self. 
The homestead angle of the case having been argued 
heretofore, we now merely ·Call .attention to the fact that 
from 1933 to 1939, Josie, with full knowledge of the 
B'ank's claim of lien, made no challe:nge ·against said 
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lien, and put forth no .eff~a:rt to rec:over it. She did 
not ever say that the stock had been wrongfully pledged. 
The most she ever said was that if it had been pledged 
she didn't know anything a'bout it. But it was pledged 
and she knew it for six year.s without -challenging it. 
How could she~ She joined her husband in business. 
She left the entire management of the business to him. 
l-Ie had to borrow money to run the business. This she 
knew, and this .she acquiesced in. She shared the pro-
cee·ds of the loans. She recognized the debts as her own 
by helping to pay them. To the very end she breathed 
no word of impropriety against Harold's conduct of the 
business. She didn't even charge _,him with bad judg-
ment. He was a good husband; what was his, was her.s 
always. She drew on the hank account without let or 
hinderance, and stopped drawing only because ther~e was 
no more money to draw. 
Their business was a combination of ranch, water 
and sheep. The money borrowed was to further the 
busine.ss. Can it be doubted in face of all the foregoing 
that Harold had full authority to do all that was neces-
sary to be done to further the business including the 
pledging of the business property to seeure business 
loans. 
We think not. If Josie •SO put her affairs in the 
hands of her husband, Harold, as to give the appearance 
that he had authority to pledge the water certificates 
standing in her name, the Bank holds those certificates 
free from her equities. Ga.rfield Banking Co1npany v~ 
Argyle, 64 U. 572; 232 P. 541. 
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In effect, appellants argue that even if an agency 
or partnership is established, still there wa.s no authority 
to rene'v the note and pledg·e of May 21, 1929, in 1933, 
which renewal of 1933 was sued on by the Bank ·Com-
missioner. This is not so. See, Interstate Trust Com-
pany'~_;\ Headhtnd, 51 U. 543,171 P. 515·; Gray v. J(app·os, 
90 U. 300,61 P. (2d) 613; Key v. Thomas Lyons Co., 
198 P. 928 and Healy v. Gino.ff, 220 P. 539. 
Again appellants argue (Appellants' Brief 17): 
'''The la ",. is well settled that since certificates of 
stock a:ve not negotiable instruments, a transferee 
acquires no better ti tie than his transferor had 
unless the circumstances are such as to create an 
estoppel in his favor. It £ollow.s that a transfer 
of a cert~fieate of stock, even to a bona fide pur-
chaser or pledgee by one who hH.s no title or 
authority to transfer the same, gives the trans-
feree no title to the stock as against the true 
owner unless the latter is for some reason, es-
topped to assert his title, or except in those juris-
dictions which have .adopted the Uniform Stock 
Transfer A·ct. (Citing authorities). In the ab-
sence of a statute the law announced in the fore-
going text and cases .seems to be well settled and 
to the effect that shares of stock represented by a 
·Certificate are in the main suhject to the same 
rules of law that apply to the sale of personal 
property, and that certificates are not in any sense 
negotiable instruments. We do not ha:ve the Uni-
£orm Transfer Act, * * *.'' 
This whole argument falls simply because it is not 
true. We do have the U ni£orm Transfer Act. See 
Chapter 55, Laws of Utah, 1927, and Chapter 3 of Title 
18, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
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The very first section of this act provid~s : 
'' Ti tie to a ·certificate and to shares repre-
~sented thereby -can he transferred only: 
"1. By delivery of the certificate indorsed 
~either in blank * * * by the p,erson appearing 
by the ·certificate to be the owner of the shares 
rep-resented thereby;'' 
''Stock shall be .deemed personal property.'' 
18-2-33, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
''Water stock is no different from any other 
~stock." George v. Robi,son, 23 U. 79; 63 P. 819; 
Supply Ditch Company v. Elliott, 15 P. 691 
(Colo·.); O'Ma.ra v. New.comb, 88 P. 167 (Colo.). 
Appellants argue that the deliv-ery of the certifi-
cates to the Bank in this case were unauthorized and 
that the endorsement on Certificate No. 68 was forged. 
(Appellants' Brief 19·). 
We have already shown how completely Harold was 
· authoriz·ed to pledge the !stock, which includes, of ne.c-
es•sity, all the acts nece'Ss·ary to effectuate the pledge, 
which would include endorsing the eertifi.cates. Mani-
. festly, J,osie ·endors-ed ·certificate No. 64, and manifestly 
Harold endorsed the .other. N:o one denies that Harold 
·endorsed No. ·68. He admitted that it might be his 
writing. (Tr. 300; Ab. 176). ·Compare this endorse-
, nient with hi,s signature on Exhibit B-1. 
"While it is said to be usual and better that an 
agent's signature should appear upon the instru-
ment yet this is not in all ~cases necessary, and 
an .agent authorized to sign the naine of his prin-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
73 
cipal may effe.ctually bind him by simply affixing 
the name of ~such principal as if it were his own." 
2 C. J. S. 1348, Sec. 2, and case.s cited. 
''As a general rule an instrument should recite 
the power under which the agent acts unless the 
intention to execute the power appears from the 
instrument or the surrounding' circumstances.'' 
2 ·C. J. S. 1354, Sec. 132. 
F:vom the foregoing it ap·pears that the pledge by 
Harold was in all respects legal and binding, and we 
observe that it makes no difference in this case whether 
the certificates be treated as negotiable. instruments or 
mere personal property. If Harold had mortgaged the 
sheep to secure a loan-instea~d of pledging the certificate, 
the question would still be: Did he have the authority~ 
Having fully proved the i~ssue as to the certificates 
in the affirmative, we submit that the decree of the lower 
court should stand. 
Merely to p-reserve our rights we call attention t<>: 
Page 9 of Appellants' Brief, paragraph 7, where a ques.;, 
tion is raised .as to the effect of the use of the water on 
the farm as against the rights of the bank which held the 
certificates of stock. Thi,s question is not argued in the 
Brief and we presume therefore that it is waived and 
.will not be eonsidered by the Court. We call attention 
however to the Transcript, page 324 and pages 328 and 
329, where it appears that the wa.ter repres:ented by the 
certificates was ·Conveyed to the .corporation. The com-
pany was therefore not a mutual eomp-any where the 
stockholders remain the owners of the wate.r., The waters 
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in thi,s instance were actually conveyed to the corpor-
ation and ·Certificates issued to stoekholders. 
Seotion 100-1-10, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 pro-
vides: 
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed 
in substantially the same manner .as real estate 
except when they are repre~sented by shares of 
stock in a .corporation;'' 
It seems to us that under the Utah law there ·Can be no 
adverse use under the facts in this case. Water stock is 
personal property as heretofore shown. However, we 
shall not pursue this point further for the reason that 
it is not argued by appellants. 
Resp·ectfully submitted, 
O'HENEY, JENsEN, 1\fARR & -vv ILK INs, 
GEORGE B. STANLEY, 
PAUL B. CANNON, 
DELBERT :hf. DRAPER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and R,espondents. 
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